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Abstract—Context: Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are integrations of
computation, networking, and physical processes. Due to the tight cyber-
physical coupling and to the potentially disrupting consequences of
failures, security is one of the primary concerns for this type of systems.
CPS security is attracting several research efforts from different and
independent areas (e.g., secure control, intrusion detection in SCADA
systems, etc.), each of them with specific peculiarities, features, and
capabilities, resulting in a considerably variegated and complex scientific
body of knowledge on the topic.
Objective: In this study we aim at identifying, classifying, and analyzing
existing research on CPS security in order to better understand how
security is actually addressed when dealing with cyber-physical systems.
Based on this analysis of the state of the art, we also aim at identifying
the implications for future research on CPS security.
Method: In order to achieve this, we designed and conducted a system-
atic mapping study to identify, classify, and compare relevant studies
proposing a method or technique for cyber-physical systems security. A
comparison framework for classifying methods or techniques for CPS
security has been empirically defined; identified relevant studies have
been classified on the basis of publication trends, their characteristics
and focus, and their validation strategies.
Results: We selected a total of 118 primary studies as a result of the
systematic mapping process. From the collected data we can observe that
(i) even if solutions for CPS security has emerged only recently, in the
last years they are gaining a sharply increasing scientific interest across
heterogeneous publication venues; (ii) the bulk of the works on security
for cyber-physical systems is focused on power grids, and the approaches
considering attacks on sensors and their protection completely dominate
the scene; regardless of application field and considered system compo-
nents, all the works on CPS security deal with attacks, in order to either
implement or to counteract them, and putting together all this studies
gives us the possibility to categorize the existing (cyber-physical) attack
models; it comes as surprise that very few papers consider communication
aspects or imperfections and attempt to provide non-trivial mathematical
models of the communication; (iii) most advanced and realistic validation
methods have been exploited in the power networks application domain,
but even there a benchmark is still missing.
Conclusion: The systematic map of research on CPS security provided
here is based on, for instance, application fields, various system compo-
nents, related algorithms and models, attacks characteristics and defense
strategies. This work presents a powerful comparison framework for
existing and future research on this hot topic, important for both industry
and academia.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are integrations of computation,
networking, and physical processes [1], [2]. The key characteristic of
cyber-physical systems is their seamless integration of both hardware
and software resources for computational, communication and control
purposes, all of them co-designed with the physical engineered
components [3].
The economic and societal potential of cyber-physical systems
is astonishing, and major investments are being made worldwide
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The research leading to these results has received funding from the Italian
Government under Cipe resolution n.135 (Dec. 21, 2012), project INno-
vating City Planning through Information and Communication Technologies
(INCIPICT).
to develop the technology [4]. For instance, the December 2010
report of the U.S. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology [5] called for continued investment in CPS research
because of its scientific and technological importance as well as its
potential impact on grand challenges in a number of sectors critical to
U.S. security and competitiveness, including aerospace, automotive,
chemical production, civil infrastructure, energy, healthcare, manu-
facturing, materials and transportation. Also, the anticipated funding
to research and education projects on CPS amounts to approximately
$32,000,000 each year [6], and the European Union has a similar
vision on the importance of research on CPS with fundings focusing
on this area.
Applications of CPS arguably have the potential to dwarf the 20-th
century IT revolution [7], [8]. Among the many applications of CPS
we can find high confidence medical devices and systems, assisted
living, traffic control and safety, advanced automotive systems, pro-
cess control, energy conservation, environmental control, avionics,
instrumentation, critical infrastructure control (electric power, water
resources, and communications systems for example), distributed
robotics (telepresence, telemedicine), defense, manufacturing, smart
structures, etc.
It goes without saying that in this type of systems security is a
primary concern and, because of the tight cyber-physical coupling, it
is one of the main scientific challenges. Indeed, CPS security is at-
tracting several research efforts from different and independent areas
(e.g., secure control, intrusion detection in SCADA systems, etc.),
each of them with specific peculiarities, features, and capabilities.
However, if on one side having many research efforts from different
and independent areas on CPS security confirms its importance from
a scientific point of view, on the other side it is very difficult to
have a holistic view on this important domain. Under this perspective,
even if the progress of research on cyber-physical systems has started
more than ten years ago and the various research communities are
very active, the trends, characteristics, and the validation strategies
of existing research on CPS security are still unclear. With this work
we aim at filling this gap.
Goal of this work is to identify, classify, and analyze existing
research on cyber-physical systems security in order to better under-
stand how security is actually addressed when dealing with cyber-
physical systems.
In order to tackle our goal we apply a well-established methodol-
ogy from the Medical and Software Engineering research communi-
ties called systematic mapping [9], [10] (see Section II-C), applying
it on the peer reviewed papers which propose and validate a method
or technique for CPS security enforcing or breaching. Through our
systematic mapping process, we selected 118 primary studies among
more than a thousand entries fitting at best three research questions
we identified (see Section III-A). Then, we defined a classification
framework composed of more than 40 different parameters for
comparing state-of-the-art approaches, and we applied it to the 118
selected studies. Finally, we analyzed and discussed the obtained
data for extracting emergent research challenges and implications for
future research on CPS security. The main contributions of this study
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2are:
• a reusable comparison framework for understanding, classifying,
and comparing methods or techniques for CPS security;
• a systematic review of current methods or techniques for CPS
security, useful for both researchers and practitioners;
• a discussion of emerging research challenges and implications
for future research on CPS security.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first system-
atic investigation into the state of the art of research on CPS security.
The results of this study provide a complete, comprehensive and
replicable picture of the state of the art of research on CPS security,
helping researchers and practitioners in finding trends, characteristics,
and validation strategies of current research on security-aware cyber-
physical (co-)design, intrusion detection, forecast and response, its
future potential and applicability.
The main findings produced by our analysis are discussed below:
Publication trends: even if the need for methods and techniques for
CPS security has emerged only in 2008, in the last years there is
an increasing need and scientific interest on methods and techniques
for CPS security. Also, CPS security is turning more and more into
a mature field, with more foundational and comprehensive studies
published in the recent years. Cyber-physical systems security has
a very multidisciplinary nature and it has been broadly considered
by researchers with different research interests, such as smart grid,
automatic control, communications, networked systems, parallel and
distributed systems, etc.
Characteristics and focus: the bulk of the works on CPS security
is focused on power grids, while somehow surprisingly, we have
not found any work on the cyber-physical security of medical CPS,
and only a small part of selected papers is within the application
field of secure control of (unmanned) ground vehicles and aerial
systems, and of heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning in large
functional buildings. All the works considered in this mapping study
deal with attacks, in order to either implement or to counteract them:
putting together all this studies gives us the possibility to categorize
the existing (cyber-physical) attack models. The defense strategies
are presented in most of the studies, occupying the central spot of
the research efforts on CPS security. More than 90% of the works
are concerned with system integrity, threatened by various types
of deception attacks. Regarding the considered system components,
the approaches considering attacks on sensors and their protection
completely dominate the scene; in fact the resilient state estimation
under measurement attacks is a very active research topic within
the area of cyber-physical security. Somehow unexpectedly, very few
papers consider communication aspects or imperfections and attempt
to provide non-trivial mathematical models of the communication;
the centralized schemes dominate both attack and defense solutions.
Validation strategies: most advanced and realistic validation methods
have been exploited in the power networks application domain, but
even there a benchmark is still missing. Even if the repeatability
process, capturing how a third party may reproduce the validation
results of the method or technique, is recognized as a good scientific
practice, we found no studies providing a replication package. So,
we put a particular attention on analysis and description of standard
test systems and experimental testbeds used by researchers studying
various aspects of CPS security.
By presenting and discussing the above mentioned results we are
the first to provide an overview of the state of the art of research
in CPS security, thus our work can certainly be useful for both
researchers (either young or experienced ones) and practitioners in
the field of CPS security. Finally, we use the results of this study for
discussing potential implications for future research on CPS security.
Article outline. The article is organized as follows. In Section II
we provide background notions for setting the context of our study
by clarifying and discussing (i) cyber-physical systems, (ii) CPS
security, (iii) the methodology we followed (i.e., systematic mapping),
and (iv) related work. Section III describes in details our research
methodology in designing, conducting, and documenting the study1,
followed by a discussion of the obtained results in Sections IV, V and
VI. We discuss the implications for future research on CPS security
in Section VII and limitations and threats to validity in Section VIII.
Section IX closes the article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Cyber-physical systems
The term cyber-physical systems (CPS) emerged around 2006,
when it was coined at the National Science Foundation (NSF) in
the United States [1], with the “cyber” part of the name resulting
from the term “cybernetics”, introduced as metaphor apt for control
systems [11].
(a) The three main functional components of a CPS
(b) CPS as networked control system [12]
Fig. 1: Two main abstractions of cyber-physical systems
As shown in Figure 1, CPS can be seen as a family of control
systems related to the domain of embedded sensor and actuator
networks [2], thus close relative of Process Control Systems (PCS)
and of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
However, the seamless integration of both hardware and software
computational, communication and control resources, co-designed
together with physical engineered components [13] is what sets cyber-
physical systems discipline apart [3].
1Readers principally interested in the results of our study and future
research directions may directly jump to subsequent sections and come back
to this section after the first read of the paper.
3B. Security of CPS
Uncertainty in the environment, security attacks, and errors in
physical devices make ensuring overall system security a critical
challenge for CPS [14]. Furthermore, a cyber-physical coupling allow
sophisticated adversaries to perform attacks threatening also other
key attributes of the system, first and foremost safety [15]–[17].
This is the reason why, among several crucial requirements of CPS,
today many researchers are interested in various (unique) aspects
of cyber-physical systems security; for example investigating on
combined cyber-physical attack models, reply attacks used to render
a pre-defined physical attack to an industrial plant stealthy [18],
secure control [12], anomaly-based intrusion detection [19], intrusion
detection in SCADA systems using multidimensional critical state
analysis [20].
CPS security presents a number of peculiar characteristics that
distinguish it from more conventional IT systems security [21],
[22]. For instance, with cyber-physical systems we have real-time
requirements, where response is time-critical, modest throughput is
acceptable, high delay and/or jitter is not tolerable, and response to
human or other emergency interaction is essential. Such systems are
often resource-constrained and may not tolerate typical IT security
practices. Even the usual definition of security as the combination
of three primary security attributes of confidentiality, integrity and
availability [23] assumes for the cyber-physical systems a completely
new meaning [12]. Given that the estimation and control algorithms
used in CPS are designed to satisfy certain operational goals, such
as, closed-loop stability, safety, liveness, or the optimization of a
performance function, availability in CPS can be viewed as the
ability to maintain the operational goals by preventing or surviving
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [24] to the information collected by
the sensor networks, the commands given by the controllers, and
the physical actions taken by the actuators. Similarly, CPS integrity
aims to maintain the operational goals by preventing, detecting, or
surviving deception attacks [25] in the information sent and received
by the sensors, the controllers, and the actuators. The intent of
confidentiality in CPS is to prevent an adversary from inferring the
state of the physical system by eavesdropping on the communication
channels between the sensors and the controller, and between the
controller and the actuator or by means of side channel attacks [26]
on sensors, controllers and actuators.
In the literature there are several approaches addressing the primary
security objectives of cyber-physical system availability, integrity and
confidentiality. From a high-level point of view, security can be seen
as a system-wide concern that takes into account both (i) design for
security [27] and (ii) security mechanisms [28].
Design for security. Multiple Independent Levels of Security/Safety
(MILS) [29] approach, Defense in Depth [30] strategy, and Moving
Target Defense [31] paradigm, together with classic Saltzer and
Schroeder’s considerations [32], provide relevant design principles.
Since cyber-physical systems may be subject to attacks from re-
sourceful adversaries [33], in the design and analysis of security-
aware CPS [34], it is important to include the trust [23] analysis
of the architecture, consider realistic and rational adversary models
[18], and employ quantitative security metrics, e.g. [35]–[38]. To
gain confidence in the security and in the correctness of the system
design and implementation, formal verification approaches [39]–[41]
such as Theorem Proving and/or Model Checking should be applied.
For instance, Common Criteria (ISO 15408) standard for Information
Technology Security Evaluation requires the use of formal methods
for the high Evaluation Assurance Levels (5 to 7).
Security mechanisms. A typical-cyber security preventive technical
mechanisms [42] related but not specific to CPS include authen-
tication, authorization/access control, accountability, cryptography,
and boundary protection. Reactive security mechanisms for cyber-
physical systems, a.k.a. intrusion detection [43], together with au-
tomatic response and recovery, can instead greatly benefit from
the particular characteristics of this type of systems, thanks to the
possibility to use the models of the physical system [2] to reveal
anomalies in the behavior.
C. Systematic mapping studies
A systematic mapping study (or scoping study) is a research
methodology particularly intended to provide an unbiased, objective
and systematic instrument to answer a set of research questions by
finding all of the relevant research outcomes in a specific research
area (CPS security in our paper) [9]. Research questions of mapping
studies are designed to provide an overview of a research area by
classifying and counting research contributions in relation to a set of
well-defined categories such as publication type, forum, frequency,
assumptions made, followed research method, etc. [10], [44]. The
mapping process involves searching and analyzing the literature in
order to identify, classify, and understand existing research on a
specific topic of interest.
In the recent years many researchers are conducting systematic
mapping studies on a number of areas and using different guide-
lines or methods (e.g., on technical debt [45], search-base soft-
ware engineering [46], model-driven engineering for wireless sensor
networks [47]). In a recent study [9] it emerged that at least ten
different guidelines have been proposed for designing the systematic
mapping process. We conducted our study by considering the two
most commonly accepted and followed guidelines according to [9],
specifically: the ones proposed by Kitchenham and Charters [10]
and Petersen et al. [44], respectively. Also, we refined our mapping
process according to the results of a consolidating update on how to
conduct systematic mapping studies proposed by Petersen et al. in
2015 [9]. Finally, due to the various specificities of existing research
on CPS (e.g., the presence of many different definitions of CPS, the
intrinsic multidisciplinarity of existing research on CPS, etc.), we
found it appropriate to tailor the method and classification schemes
proposed in the guidelines according to our topic. The method we
followed in our systematic mapping study is detailed in Section III.
D. The need for a systematic mapping study on security for CPS
As it was outlined in the introduction, there is a lack of system-
atic studies on cyber-physical systems security. In order to ground
this claim and establishing the need for performing a mapping
study on security for cyber-physical systems, we searched a set
of electronic data sources (i.e., those listed in Section III-B), for
systematic studies on security-aware cyber-physical co-design, self-
protection and related security mechanisms specific to CPS2 without
any success. None of the retrieved publications was related to any
of our research questions detailed in Section III-A. So, we can
claim that our research complements the related works described in
Section II-E to investigate the state-of-research about cyber-physical
systems security.
In this systematic mapping study we aim to identify, classify,
and understand existing research on cyber-physical systems security.
Those activities will help researchers and practitioners in identifying
limitations and gaps of current research [10] on security-aware cyber-
physical (co-)design, intrusion detection, forecast and response, its
future potential, and its potential applicability in the context of real-
world projects.
2Search performed on January 5, 2015.
4E. Related studies
Cyber-physical systems security within the smart grid domain has
been reviewed by Mo, Kim, Brancik, Dickinson, Lee, Perrig and
Sinopoli [48] and by Sridhar, Hahn and Govindarasu [49].
The work from Mo et al. [48] is a good starting point to face the
area of CPS security since it gives a broad overview on cyber and
system-theoretic approaches to security and shows how a combination
of both of them together can provide better security level than
traditional methods. The provided example describes defense against
replay attack [50] following secure control [12] method.
The article from Sridhar, Hahn and Govindarasu [49] is more
domain-specific. Since power system is functionally divided into
generation, transmission, and distribution, the survey considers cyber
vulnerabilities and security solutions for each of the underlying fields.
Notably, it deals with a wide range of (sophisticated) attacks [51]–
[53], some bad data detection techniques [54], [55] and mentions
attack resilient control. This work provides also an overview on sup-
porting infrastructure security, with a look on secure communication,
device security, security management and awareness, cyber security
evaluation, and intrusion tolerance. All in all, the paper identifies
the importance of combining both power application security and
supporting infrastructure security into the risk assessment process
and provides a methodology for impact evaluation. Conclusively, it
lists a number of emerging research challenges in risk modeling and
mitigation, pointing out the importance of attack resilient control,
domain-specific anomaly detection and intrusion tolerance.
Both of previous surveys [48], [49] are focused on smart grid
domain-specific security. Moreover, based on the guidelines for per-
forming systematic literature reviews from Kitchenham and Charters
[10], these studies cannot be considered as a systematic literature
reviews but as informal literature surveys.
The intrusion detection techniques for different CPS applications
were surveyed by Mitchell and Chen [43]. For each presented
intrusion detection system (IDS) design it was analyzed which, if any,
distinguishing characteristics of cyber-physical intrusion detection
were considered. The unique characteristics of cyber-physical intru-
sion detection listed in this study are physical process monitoring,
closed control loops, attack sophistication and legacy technologies.
The conclusion was that there is a lack of IDS techniques that
specifically consider most or all distinguishing aspects of CPS.
Other notable remark was that behavior-specification-based detection,
which formally define legitimate behavior and detects an intrusion
when the system departs from this model, has a potential to be the
most effective one and deserves more research attention. A similar
inference was made by Zhu and Sastry in their survey of SCADA-
specific IDS [56]. Although the works on intrusion detection are
relevant for our study, our goal is to give a much broader holistic
view on cyber-physical security, and not only on a particular family
of mechanisms.
III. METHOD
Figure 2 shows the overview of the process we followed for
carrying on our study. The overall process can be divided into three
main phases, which are the well-accepted ones for performing a
systematic study [10], [57]: planning, conducting, and documenting.
Each phase has a number of output artifacts, e.g., the planning
phase produces the protocol we followed in our study. In order to
mitigate potential threats to validity and possible biases, some of
the produced artifacts has been circulated to external experts for
independent review. More specifically, we identified two classes of
external experts: SLR experts who focused on the overall design of
the study and domain experts focusing more on aspects related to
security for cyber-physical systems. We contacted and received the
feedback of one SLR expert and two domain experts, who reviewed
our review protocol and final report independently.
In the following we will go through each phase of the process,
highlighting its main activities and produced artifacts.
1) Planning: In addition to establishing the need for performing a
mapping study on security for cyber-physical systems, in this phase
we identified the main research questions (see Section III-A), and
we produced a well-defined review protocol describing in details the
various steps we had to follow in our study. The produced review
protocol has been independently evaluated by the previously named
SLR- and domain-experts, and it has been refined according to their
feedback. The final version of the review protocol is publicly available
as part of the replication package of this study3.
2) Conducting: In this phase we set the previously defined pro-
tocol into practice. More specifically, we performed the following
activities:
• Studies search: we performed a combination of techniques
for identifying the comprehensive set of candidate entries on
security for cyber-physical systems. Section III-B will describe
in details the search strategy of this research.
• Studies selection: the candidate entries identified in the previous
activity has been filtered in order to obtain the final list of pri-
mary studies to be considered in later activities of the protocol.
The details of this phase are given in Section III-B.
• Comparison framework definition: in this activity we defined
the set of parameters for comparing the primary studies. The
main outcome of this activity is the data extraction form,
which is a document explaining the possible values and the
meaning of each parameter of the comparison framework (see
Section III-D). The data extraction form is available as part of
the replication package of our study.
• Data extraction: In this activity we went into the details of each
primary study, and we filled a corresponding data extraction
form, as defined in the previous activity. Filled forms has been
collected and aggregated in order to be ready to be analyzed
during the next activities. More details about this activity will
be presented in Section III-D.
• Data synthesis: this activity focuses on a comprehensive sum-
mary and analysis of the data extracted in the previous activity.
The main goal of this activity is to elaborate on the extracted
data in order to address each research question of our study
(see Section III-A). This activity involves both quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the extracted data. The details about this
activity are in Section III-E.
3) Documenting: This phase is fundamental for reasoning on the
obtained findings and for evaluating the quality of the systematic
literature review. The main activities performed in this phase are:
(i) a thorough elaboration on the data extracted in the previous
phase with the main aim at setting the obtained results in their
context, (ii) the analysis of possible threats to validity, and (iii) the
writing of a set of reports describing the performed mapping study to
different audiences. Produced reports have been evaluated by SLR-
and domain- experts. This article itself is an example of produced
final report.
A. Research questions
It is fundamental to clearly define the research questions of a
systematic literature study [58]. Before going into the details of the
identified research questions, we formulate the goal of this research
3Replication package of this study: http://cs.gssi.infn.it/CPSSecurity
5Fig. 2: Overview of the whole review process
by using the Goal-Question-Metric perspectives (i.e., purpose, issue,
object, viewpoint [59]). Table I shows the result of the above
mentioned formulation.
TABLE I: Goal of this research
Purpose Analyze the
Issue publication trends, characteristics, and validation strategies
Object of existing methods and techniques for CPS security
Viewpoint from a researcher’s point of view.
The goal presented above can be refined into the following main
research questions. For each research question we also provide its
primary objective of investigation. The research questions of this
study are:
• RQ1 - What are the publication trends of research studies on
cyber-physical systems security?
Objective: to classify primary studies in order to assess interest,
relevant venues, and contribution types; depending on the num-
ber of primary studies, trends can be assessed over the years.
• RQ2 - What are the characteristics and focus of existing research
on cyber-physical systems security?
Objective: to analyze and classify all the existing approaches
for CPS security with respect to the specific concerns they want
to address (e.g., cyber and physical security, secure control,
physical-model-based and network-model-based intrusion detec-
tion, or any combination of them).
• RQ3 - What are the validation strategies of existing approaches
for cyber-physical systems security?
Objective: to analyze and classify all the existing approaches for
CPS security with respect to the strategies used for assessing
their validity (e.g., controlled experiment, industrial application,
prototype-based experiment, test bed, simple examples, correct-
ness by construction, formal proofs).
Answering RQ1 will give a detailed overview about publication
trends, venues, and research groups active on the topic. The clas-
sification resulting from our investigation on RQ2 and RQ3 will
provide a solid foundation for a thorough comparison of existing and
future solutions for cyber-physical systems security. This contribution
is especially useful for researchers willing to further contribute this
research area with new approaches to cyber-physical systems security,
or willing to better understand or refine existing ones.
The above listed research questions drove the whole systematic
mapping study, with a special influence on the primary studies search
process, the data extraction process, and the data analysis process.
B. Search strategy
Goal of our search strategy is to detect as much relevant material
as possible, because leaving relevant results out of a systematic
literature study may lead to inaccurate evidence, thus resulting in
an internal threat to validity [60].
Figure 3 shows the details about our search strategy. In order
to achieve maximal coverage, our search strategy consists of three
complementary methods: an automatic search, a manual search, and
the snowballing.
Fig. 3: Overview of the search and selection process
61) Automatic search: It refers to the execution of a search string
on a set of electronic databases and indexing systems, in the literature
it is the dominant method for identifying potentially relevant papers
[61]. The applied search string is the following:
((((“cyber physical” OR “cyber-physical” OR cyberphysical
OR “networked control”) AND system*) OR CPS OR NCS)
AND (attack* OR secur* OR protect*))
In the spirit of Zhang, Babar and Tell [62], we established a
quasi-gold standard (QGS) for creating a good search string for
the automatic search. This procedure requires a manual search in
a small number of venues (see Table III) and the results of these
manual searches have been treated as a QGS by cross-checking the
results obtained from the automatic search. So, we iteratively defined
and modified the search string and conducted automatic searches
on the electronic data sources until the quasi-sensitivity was above
the established threshold of 80%. When the quasi-sensitivity became
greater than 80%, the search performance was considered acceptable
and the results from the automated search have been merged with
the QGS. The details of the above mentioned process are provided
in the replication package of this study.
In this stage it was fundamental to select papers objectively so,
following the suggestions from Wohlin et al. [57], two researchers
assessed a random sample of the studies and the inter-researcher
agreement has been measured using the Cohen Kappa statistic [63].
Each disagreement has been discussed and resolved, with the inter-
vention of the team administrator, if necessary, until the Cohen Kappa
statistic reached a result above or equal to 0.80.
Our automatic search is performed on the six electronic data
sources listed in Table II. As suggested in [64], in order to cover
as much relevant literature as possible, we chose six of the largest
and most complete scientific databases and indexing systems available
in computer science. The selection of these electronic databases and
indexing systems is guided also by their high accessibility and their
ability to export search results to well-defined formats.
TABLE II: Electronic data sources targeted with search strings
Library Website
ACM Digital Library http://dl.acm.org
IEEE Explore http://ieeexplore.ieee.org
ISI Web of Science http://apps.webofknowledge.com
ScienceDirect http://www.sciencedirect.com
SpringerLink http://link.springer.com
Wiley InterScience http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/+
Among the results of the automatic searches we removed a set
of false positives in order to work on a polished set of potentially
relevant studies (see Figure 3). Examples of false positives include
proceedings of conferences or workshops, tables of contents, maps,
lists of program committee members, keynotes, tutorial or invited
talks, and messages from (co-)chairs. As shown in Figure 3, our
automatic search resulted in 1559 potentially relevant studies.
For the sake of replicability, we provide all the details, data, and
results of our automatic search in the Automatic search report in the
replication package of this study.
2) Manual search: By following the quasi-gold standard proce-
dure defined in [62], we (i) identified a subset of important venues
for the domain of cyber-physical systems security (they are shown
in Table III), and (ii) we performed a manual search of relevant
publications in those venues. The search have been performed by
considering title and abstract of each publication and the considered
time interval is between December 2008 and November 2014 (since
the earliest of above mentioned venues dates back to December 2008).
By referring to Figure 3, we manually searched and selected 289
potentially relevant studies.
TABLE III: Selected venues for manual search
Venue Publisher
International Conference on High Confidence Networked
Systems (HiCoNS)
ACM
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
(IJCIP)
Elsevier
International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems
(ISRCS)
IEEE
The outcomes of the automatic and manual searches have been
suitably merged in order to have one single source of information
for the subsequent selection and snowballing activities. After merging
all the studies and removing duplicates we obtained 1848 potentially
relevant studies. In order to further restrict the number of studies to be
considered during the snowballing activity, we applied the selection
process depicted in Section III-C to the current set of studies, thus
obtaining 63 potentially relevant studies. For the sake of replicability,
we provide all the details, data, and results of our manual search in
the Manual search report in the replication package of this study.
3) Snowballing: We applied the snowballing technique for iden-
tifying additional sources published in other journals or venues [65],
which may not have been considered during the automatic and manual
searches. So, as recommended in [66], we applied (backward and
forward) snowballing on the primary studies selected by the automatic
and manual searches. More specifically, we considered all the studies
selected by the automatic and manual searches and we automatically
searched all the papers referring them (i.e., forward snowballing
[67]); then, we scrutinized also the references of each selected study
to identify important studies that might have been missed during
the initial search (i.e., backward snowballing [67]). We provide all
the details, data, and results of our snowballing activities in the
Snowballing report in the replication package of this study.
In all considered search methods we examined title, keywords and
abstract.
C. Selection strategy
As shown in Figure 3, after the search activity we considered all
the collected studies and filtered them according to a set of well-
defined inclusion and exclusion criteria. In the following we provide
the inclusion criteria of our study:
• Studies focusing on security of cyber-physical systems.
• Studies proposing a method or technique for cyber-physical
system security enforcing or breaching.
• Studies providing some kind of validation of the proposed
method or technique (e.g., via formal analysis, controlled ex-
periment, exploitation in industry, example usage).
The exclusion criteria of our study are:
• Studies not subject to peer review [57] (e.g., journal papers, pa-
pers published as part of conference proceedings are considered,
whereas white papers are discarded).
• Studies written in any language other than English.
• Studies focusing on security method or technique not specific
to cyber-physical system (e.g studies focusing on either the
physical or cyber part only of the system under consideration).
• Studies published before 2006 (because the cyber-physical sys-
tems discipline has emerged in 2006).
• Secondary or tertiarty studies (e.g., systematic literature reviews,
surveys, etc.).
7• Studies in the form of tutorial papers, short papers, poster papers,
editorials, because they do not provide enough information.
In this context, a study was selected as a primary study if it satisfied
all inclusion criteria, and it was discarded if it met any exclusion
criterion. In order to reduce bias, the selection criteria of this study
have been decided during the review protocol definition (thus they
have been checked by three external reviewers).
In order to handle studies selection in a cost effective way we
used the adaptive reading depth [68], as the full-text reading of clearly
excluded approaches is unnecessary. So, we considered title, keywords
and abstract of each potentially relevant study and, if selection
decision could not be made, other information (like conclusion or
even full-text) have been exploited [62]. By following the approach
proposed in [69], two researchers classified each potentially relevant
study either as relevant, uncertain, or irrelevant; any study classified
as irrelevant has been directly excluded, whereas all the other
approaches have been discussed with the help of a third researcher.
When reading a primary study in details for extracting its informa-
tion, researchers could agree that the currently analysed study was
semantically out of the scope of our research, and so it has been
excluded (see the Exclusion during Data Extraction stage in Figure
3), resulting in 194 potentially primary studies.
As suggested in [57], if a primary study was published in more
then one paper (e.g., if a conference paper has been extended to
a journal version) then we considered only one reference paper as
primary study; in those cases we considered all the related papers
during the data extraction activity in order to obtain all the necessary
data [10]. The final set of primary studies is composed of 118 entries,
the detailed list of our primary studies is provided in Appendix B.
D. Data extraction
Data extraction refers to the recording of all the relevant infor-
mation from the primary studies required to answer the research
questions [57]. Before analysing each primary study, we defined
a comparison framework for classifying research studies on cyber-
physical systems security.
To help the definition of a sound and complete comparison frame-
work, we selected and adapted suitable dimensions and properties
found in existing surveys and taxonomies related to CPS security,
such as those proposed in [23], [70]–[72]. In addition, we defined
several parameters for classifying methods and techniques for CPS
security; we grouped those parameters into three main dimensions:
method or technique’s Positioning, Characterisation and Valida-
tion.
The Positioning dimension characterizes the objectives and intent
of existing research on CPS security (the WHAT aspect of each
method or technique). For example, this dimension includes the
following parameters:
• CPS application field, such as power distribution, unmanned
aerial systems, etc.;
• considered security attributes like availability, integrity, and
confidentiality;
• system components, including sensors, actuators, network, con-
trollers and plant.
The Characterization dimension concerns the classification of
studies based on HOW CPS security is addressed in research. It
include several parameters, like:
• theoretical foundations, such as control theory, compressed
sensing, graph theory, computational complexity, etc.;
• defense strategy, like detection, mitigation, protection-based
prevention, etc.
The Validation dimension concerns the strategies researchers apply
for providing evidence about the validity of proposed methods or
techniques for CPS security. Examples of relevant parameters of this
dimension are the following:
• Simulation test systems, such as IEEE 24-bus reliability test
system, Tennessee Eastman challenge, etc.;
• Repeatability, to capture how a third party may reproduce the
validation results of the method or technique. We considered the
repeatability of a study as high when the authors provide enough
details about the steps performed for evaluating or validating
the study, the developed or used software, the used or simulated
testbed, if any, and any other additional resource; low otherwise.
All the dimensions and parameters of our comparison framework
have been encoded in a dedicated data extraction form, which can be
seen as the implementation of a comparison framework. The final data
extraction form is composed of a list of attributes representing the set
of data items extracted from the primary studies. Our data extraction
form has been designed to collect such information from each
primary study; it includes both standard information (such as name of
reviewer, date of data extraction, title, authors and publication details
of the study) [10] and the set of parameters to compare the primary
studies according to the three dimensions described above (e.g., the
used state estimation model, attack model, experimental testbed, etc.).
For the sake of brevity we do not provide the description of all the
parameters of our data extraction form, we will briefly elaborate on
each of them while discussing the results of this study in Sections
IV, V and VI; the interested reader can refer to the Data extraction
form document of our replication package for thorough and extensive
discussion of all parameters of our classification framework.
As suggested in [57], the data extraction form (and thus also the
classification framework) has been independently piloted on a sample
of primary studies by two researchers, and iteratively refined accord-
ingly. Then, the data extraction activity has been conducted by two
researchers who manually filled a copy of the data extraction form
for each primary study; the overall effort to complete this activity
can be estimated as 3 man-months with full-time commitment.
E. Data synthesis
The data synthesis activity involves collating and summarizing
the data extracted from the primary studies with the main goal of
understanding, analyzing, and classifying current research on security
for cyber-physical systems [10, S 6.5].
We analyzed the extracted data to find trends and collect infor-
mation about each research question of our study. Depending on the
parameters of the classification framework (see Section III-D), in
this research we applied both quantitative and qualitative synthesis
methods, separately. When considering qualitative data, we applied
the line of argument synthesis [57], that is: firstly we analyzed each
primary study individually in order to document it and tabulate
its main features with respect to each specific parameter of the
classification framework defined in Section III-D, then we analyzed
the set of studies as a whole, in order to reason on potential patterns
and trends. When both quantitative and qualitative analyses have been
performed, we integrated their results in order to explain quantitative
results by using qualitative results [10, S 6.5]. In the following
sections we present the results of our analysis of the extracted data. In
total 118 publications have been selected and analyzed as the subjects
of our study. For the sake of clarity we organized the results of the
analysis according to our research questions (see Section III-A).
IV. RESULTS - PUBLICATION TRENDS (RQ1)
In order to assess the publication trends about security for cyber-
physical systems we identified a set of variables focusing on the
8publication and bibliographic data of each primary study. For each
primary study we collected its title, authors, authors’ institutions,
authors’ countries, publication year, publication venue (i.e., journal,
conference, workshop, book), as well as other bibliographic data. In
the following we describe the main facts emerging from our analysis.
A. Publication timeline
Figure 4 presents the distribution of the selected publications4 on
security for cyber-physical systems over the time period from 2006
to 2015. The first interesting result of our study is the growth of
the number of those publications in the last years. Indeed, we can
observe that there was a relatively low number of publications on
this topic over the time period from 2006 (zero publications) to 2010
(5 publications). Starting from 2011, we see a continuous growing
trend over the years, culminating in the 2014 and 2015 years, which
together amount for the 61.8% of the selected studies.
Fig. 4: Distribution of primary studies by year (partial data for 2015)
From the collected data, we can offer the following observations:
• there are no selected studies until 2009; this may be because the
main concepts and research interest on cyber-physical systems
emerged only around 2006 [1], and the need for methods and
techniques for CPS security has emerged only recently;
• there is a sharp increase in the number of selected studies
between 2012 and 2014; we can trace this observation to the fact
that (i) in the last years methods and techniques for CPS security
are gaining increasing interest and attention from a scientific
point of view and (ii) methods and techniques for CPS security
are getting urgently needed to produce industry-ready systems
with the required levels of security and reliability;
• our study covers the studies published before April 2015;
nevertheless, in this year 31 studies have been already published
on CPS security, representing the 26.4% of the whole set of
primary studies of our research; this result further confirms the
growing attention and need of research on CPS security; we
expect that this growing trend will continue;
• finally, we can notice that 117 (99.2%) out of the 118 selected
studies were published during the last five years; this can be
seen as an indication that CPS security is a relatively new area,
which is gaining more and more traction from a scientific point
of view; this observation is further strengthened by the fact that
the highest slope is between 2013 and 2014, where the number
of publications has more than doubled, going from 18 (15.3%)
to 43 (36.4%).
4See Section III-C for details on selection strategy, which, of course,
determined the results presented here.
B. Publication venues
In accordance with our selection strategy, we selected publications
which have been subject to peer review. Indeed, each primary study
was published either as a journal paper, conference paper, workshop
paper, or book chapter. Figure 5 shows the distribution of primary
studies over their publication types. The most common publication
types are journal and conference, with 59 (50.01%) and 50 (42.37%)
of the primary studies, respectively. Book chapter and workshop are
the least popular publication types, with only 6 (5.08%) and 3 (2.54%)
studies falling into their categories, respectively. Such a high number
of journal and conference papers on CPS security may indicate that
CPS security is becoming more and more a mature research theme,
despite its relative young age (the first publication on CPS security
was in 2009).
Fig. 5: Distribution of primary studies by type of publication
Moreover, the very low number of workshop papers may be an
indication of two facts: on one side researchers on CPS security
are valuing more other types of publications (e.g., journal papers),
given the high effort and skills required to contribute in this research
area; on the other side, it may be an indication that actually the
research community on CPS security still does not have a clearly
defined identity, and a symptom of this situation may be the lack of
a workshop or conference fully dedicated to CPS security. We will
detail more on this aspect when analyzing the targeted publication
venues (see Table IV).
Fig. 6: Distribution of primary studies by type of publication and
over the years (partial data for 2015)
For what concerns the evolution of publication types of the years,
Figure 6 shows that there is a growing trend in the publications in
journals and conference proceedings, as 84 out of 118 studies are
journal and conference papers published between 2013 and 2015.
Also, almost all book chapters have been published between 2013
9and 2015 (5 out of 6 book chapters). Again, this may be a further
confirmation that CPS security is turning more and more into a mature
field, with more foundational and comprehensive studies published
in the recent years.
By looking at the specific targeted publications venues we can
notice that research on CPS security is published across a number of
venues spanning different research areas, such as automatic control,
networked systems, smart grid, security for information systems.
Indeed, the 118 selected papers of our study were published at 53
different venues. Table IV shows the publication venues with more
than one selected study, specifying venue name, type, and number of
selected studies.
TABLE IV: Publication venues with more than one selected study
Publication venue Type #Studies
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid Journal 19 (16.10%)
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) Conference 11 (9.32%)
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control Journal 9 (7.62%)
American Control Conference (ACC) Conference 6 (5.08%)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communica-
tions
Journal 6 (5.08%)
IEEE Conference on Smart Grid Communications
(SmartGridComm)
Conference 6 (5.08%)
International Conference on High Confidence
Networked Systems (HiCoNS)
Conference 4(3.38%)5
IEEE Control Systems Journal 3 (2.54%)
Global Communications Conference (GLOBE-
COM)
Conference 3 (2.54%)
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed
Systems
Journal 3 (2.54%)
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems Journal 3 (2.54%)
Automatica Journal 2 (1.69%)
ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and
Communications Security (ASIACCS)
Conference 2 (1.69%)
Cyber Physical Systems Approach to Smart Elec-
tric Power Grid
Book 2 (1.69%)
International Journal of Systems Science Journal 2 (1.69%)
TOTAL - 81 (68.64%)
Firstly, the clear winner is the IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,
with a total of 19 studies out of 118, representing the 16.10% of all
selected studies; then the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
(CDC) and the IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control follow with
11 and 9 studies, respectively. Those publication venues can be
considered as the de facto leading venues for publishing studies on
CPS security. Other publication venues follow until reaching a total
number of 81 selected studies, which represent the 68.64% of all
selected studies. From the collected data we can offer the following
observations:
• the most targeted venues are heterogeneous and pertain to
different research areas, such as smart grid, automatic control,
communications, networked systems, parallel and distributed
systems, etc.; this is a clear indication of the very multidis-
ciplinary nature of cyber-physical systems, even in a specific
sub-area like CPS security; this finding indicates also that
CPS security has been broadly considered by researchers with
different research interests;
• according to two well-acknowledged international rankings the
most targeted venues for CPS security are all top-level and very
reputable in their research area. Indeed, all journals are ranked
in the first quartile according to the SCImago Journal Rank
(SJR) indicator [73], and all conferences are ranked either as
A or B according to the computer science conference rankings
(CORE) [74] (depending on data availability);
5The HiCoNS conference has been merged into the International Confer-
ence on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS) since 2015.
• interestingly, there is a whole book in the set of most targeted
venues and it is the sole publication venue specifically targeted
to research on CPS. The book is titled Cyber Physical Systems
Approach to Smart Electric Power Grid [75] and it has been
published in 2015. It aims at presenting the recent advances in
the field of modeling, simulation, control, security and reliability
of CPS in power grids; this book can be a useful reading for
current and future researchers in the area of CPS security, with
a special emphasis on power grids.
C. Research institutions
Research on CPS security is pursued in different research in-
stitutions worldwide, with a high degree of collaboration across
institutions. Indeed, our study reveals that 127 unique research
institutions have been involved in at least one selected study, and that
in average 1.79 research institutions were involved for each selected
study.
Fig. 7: Distribution of primary studies by institution (top 20)
Figure 7 focuses on the top 20 research institutions involved in
at least one selected publication. Our study reveals that the three
most active research institutions on CPS security are: the Cornell
University (USA), the University of California Berkeley (USA), and
the KTH Royal Institute of Technology (Sweden), with 9 (9.38%), 8
(8.33%), and 8 (8.33%) publications, respectively. In addition to the
results and discussion of this study, interested and future researchers
on CPS security can use the list of institutions as a reference for
identifying relevant literature on the topic. For a complete overview
of the data, interested readers can refer to the complete list of research
institutions and authors in the replication package of this study.
V. RESULTS - CHARACTERISTICS AND FOCUS OF RESEARCH
(RQ2)
As already introduced in Section III-D, we identified a set of
variables describing positioning and characterization of methods
and techniques for cyber-physical systems security breaching and/or
enforcing. With the purpose of evaluating what aspects of system are
attacked or protected by an approach, in the following we indicate
which application fields, points of view, security attributes, system
components, plant models, state estimation and anomaly detection
algorithms, controllers, communication aspects and network-induced
imperfections are considered by each primary study. Furthermore,
we give an account of the used time-scale models, attacks and their
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characteristics, attack and defense schemes, plant models used by an
attacker, defense strategies and theoretical foundations, in order to
understand how these methods and techniques are characterized.
In the remainder of this paper we will use area-proportional Euler
diagrams [76] for visualizing the distribution over parameters with
multiple values in which the discussion of their intersections is
relevant for this study.
A. CPS application field
Power grid only (with electricity market)
65 (55.08%)
Generic linear dynamical systems
28 (23.73%)
Other
25 (21.19%)
Fig. 8: Distribution of primary studies by application area
As we can see from Figure 8, from 65 out of 118 primary studies
are focused exclusively on power grids, which corresponds to the
55.08% of all selected studies. Among those, as shown in Figure 9,
45 papers (i.e., 38.14% of all the selected studies) deal exclusively
with power transmission, 8 studies address the security aspects of
the electricity market ([S061-S068]), 3 studies are focused on power
distribution ([S018, S032, S056]), 2 studies on power generation
([S005, S024]), and the remaining 7 on any combination of the
previous ones ([S002, S013, S028, S030, S049, S050, S059]).
Fig. 9: Distribution of primary studies applied in power grids
The second largest group of publications in Figure 8 counts 28
works, i.e. 23.73% of the whole set of primary studies of our research.
All these papers study the security of generic linear dynamical
systems. The proposed approaches can be used in any suitable
application. However, these works do not provide examples of a
particular application.
The last group of the remaining 25 studies is detailed in Figure 10.
These works are almost uniformly distributed among the following
applications: (unmanned) ground vehicles (UGV) accounting for 6 of
primary studies ([S084, S097, S099, S106, S111, S115]); (unmanned)
aerial systems (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles, air traffic management
systems) and hydro-systems relying on automatic control, both con-
sidered in 5 papers ([S082, S090, S093, S108, S114] and [S010, S072,
S078, S081, S083], respectively); generic (linear and non linear)
dynamical systems and linear dynamical systems with applications
to power grids, both found in 4 studies ([S035, S080, S096, S113]
and [S048, S079, S100, S118], respectively). It is worth noting
Fig. 10: Distribution of primary studies by “other” application fields
that UGV-based systems deal with the navigation and control of
teleoperated and autonomous ground vehicles, together with their
supervisory control and vehicle platooning. Finally, the security of
building automation applications is investigated in one primary study
([S088]).
From the collected data, we can offer the following observations:
• the bulk of the selected works on security for cyber-physical
systems is focused on power grids; this is not surprising, and
may be due to the fact that smart grids are recognized as a driver
for sustained economic prosperity, quality of life, and global
competitiveness of a nation, attracting big research efforts to
this area as a whole; also, the models used in this domain are
well-known and the famous false data injection attack (FDIA)
[S001] has been introduced in the context of power networks,
giving traction to this kind of research applications. Moreover,
the impressive market growth in renewable energy devices posed
novel challenging problems in the design and management of
power grids: as a consequence, the interest of energy providers
on novel methods and technologies for optimizing network
management with guaranteed performance, safety, and security
provided a tremendous boost to academic research on these
topics;
• only a small part of the selected papers presents the applica-
tions to the secure control of (unmanned) ground vehicles and
aerial systems, and of heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning
(HVAC), as well as lighting and shading, in large functional
buildings; this application fields are relatively new for the
approaches to the cyber-physical security, with the first studies
appearing only in 2012; this result can be seen as indication
of a potentially interesting direction for future research on CPS
security;
• somehow surprisingly, we have not found any work focused on
the cyber-physical security of medical CPS [77]. We suppose
that the topics of physiological close-loop control and patient
modeling are seen as not mature enough to consider the security
aspects specific to this important application field from the
control-theoretic point of view. In any case, we expect that these
topics will be considered and addressed in the near future.
B. Point of view
As reported in Figure 11, we distinguish primary studies based
on whether they treat approaches for CPS security breaching (i.e.
attack) or enforcing via some kind of countermeasures (i.e. defense),
or both. From our analysis it emerged that 62 studies over 118 focus
exclusively on the various countermeasures that a CPS may put in
place in response to an attack, whereas 28 studies (i.e., 22.88% of the
total) focus exclusively on vulnerability analysis of CPS by proposing
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or improving an attack scheme using an adversary’s point of view.
They do not study the topic of the risk treatment, which is peculiar
to the CPS designer’s or operator’s perspective. The remaining 28
works treat both attack and defense strategies.
Fig. 11: Distribution of primary studies by the adopted point of view
From this result we can observe that the defense strategies are
presented in most (76.27%) of the selected studies, occupying the
central spot of the research efforts on CPS security. A more detailed
discussion of the various defense strategies proposed in research is
provided in Section V-Q.
C. Considered security attributes
Security can be seen as a composition of three main attributes,
namely: confidentiality, integrity and availability [78], Accordingly,
we identified the security attributes considered by each primary study
in order to understand how those attributes have been investigated by
researchers on CPS security. Figure 12 shows the distribution of the
primary studies across confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Fig. 12: Distribution of primary studies by security attributes
The first thing that strikes the eye is that more than 90% of
the works are concerned with CPS integrity, threatened by various
types of deception attacks. Some of these works consider also the
availability and/or confidentiality, together with integrity. On the
contrary, only two studies ([S068, S105]) focus on the combination of
solely availability and confidentiality; those papers apply game theory
to the design of countermeasures to intelligent jamming attacks,
which have been published between the fall 2014 and 2015. For
further discussion of security attributes, see Section V-M.
D. System components
Each approach to security breaching or enforcing considers a
particular set of system components to be compromised or protected.
In our analysis we identified five main categories for describing
the main system components to be compromised or protected, that
are: sensors, actuators, network, controllers, plant. As an example,
false data injection mainly targets a set of sensors, while load
altering can attack a set of actuators. As for all deception and some
disruption attacks, we should “note that from a practical point
of view, an attack on a sensor could either be interpreted as an
attack on the node itself (making it transmit an incorrect signal),
or it could also be interpreted as an attack on the communication
link between the sensor and the receiver device; similarly an attack
on an actuator could either be interpreted as an attack on the
actuator itself, or on the communication link from the controller to
the actuator” [S079]. Thus, we say that an approach considers a
network either when it does it implicitly by considering a denial-
of-service (DoS) attack on communication links, or explicitly, by
exploiting transmission scheduling, routing or some network-induced
imperfections. Following the same line of reasoning, we say that
the work takes into account a controller when it proposes a novel
one, whereas the plant category comes into play with attacks at the
physical layer and with eavesdropping.
Figure 13 presents how system components have been considered
among all the primary studies. Sensors were taken into account 100
(84.75% of) times, 62 (52.54% of) times alone and 27 (22.88%
of) times together with actuators. The actuators themselves were
considered 33 (27.97% of) times, while network was taken into
account in 29 (24.58% of) studies.
Plant
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Actuators
Sensors
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Fig. 13: Distribution of primary studies by system components
This data suggests that the approaches considering attacks on
sensors and their protection completely dominate the scene. All the
other system components have received much less attention, with a
slight predominance of actuators and network.
E. Plant model
We have seen in Section V-A that the application domain of
research on CPS security is mainly divided between power grids
and all the others. This result is reflected also in the choice of the
mathematical models used to describe the physical domain.
In particular, power transmission is traditionally studied via a
power flow model, which is a set of equations that depict the energy
flow on each transmission line of a power grid. An AC power flow
model considers both real and reactive power and is formulated by
nonlinear equations, where the state variables are voltage magnitudes
and phase angles of the buses [79], [80]. However, state estimation
using an AC power flow model can be computationally expensive and
does not always converge to a solution. Thus, power system engineers
sometimes use a linearized power flow model, DC power flow model,
to approximate the AC power flow model [S001]. In DC model
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the reactive power is completely neglected and state variables only
consist of voltage phase angles of the buses. As of power generation,
the model based on equations describing the electromechanical swing
dynamics of the synchronous generators [81] is usually applied. In
other application domains more general linear time invariant (LTI) or
nonlinear dynamical models are used.
Figure 14 shows how the above mentioned models have been
used within the set of primary studies. The DC approximation of
power flow has been used in 53 works (44.92% of whole set), while
the more complicated and realistic AC power flow model (which is
capable to capture more subtleties) has been studied 16 (13.56% of)
times. In 6 studies both the AC power flow model and its linear
DC approximation have been used ([S023, S028, S030, S051, S056,
S057]). Other LTI models were applied in 51 (43.22% of) primary
studies. Nonlinear dynamic and swing-equation based models were
applied 13 (11.02%) and 7 (5.93 % of) times, respectively.
Swing equations−based
Nonlinear dynamical system
AC power flow
Linear time−invariant (LTI)
DC approximation of power flow
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Fig. 14: Distribution of primary studies by plant model
F. Process noise
To capture any deviation in the plant model from the real dynamics
of the controlled physical system, the process noise is used; from the
primary studies it emerged that it can be categorized into three main
classes: Gaussian, bounded (non-stochastic), and noiseless.
The distribution of primary studies by process noise is reported
in Figure 15, where the studies considering the measurement model
only (62, accounting for 52.54% of the whole set of selected papers)
were not included, since for them the facet of process noise is not
applicable.
Fig. 15: Distribution of primary studies by process noise
We can see that the noiseless and Gaussian process noise models
are the most used ones (accounted 30 and 25 times, respectively).
As shown in Figure 16, the bounded non-stochastic model (used 8
times) is starting to receive a growing attention in the very last years.
Fig. 16: Distribution of primary studies with bounded process noise
by year (partial data for 2015)
G. Measurement noise
Depending on the assumptions on the noise, sensor measurement
models can be broadly categorized into three classes: Gaussian,
bounded (non-stochastic) and noiseless [S116].
As shown in Figure 17, the majority of primary studies (78,
i.e. 66.10%) uses Gaussian measurement noise model; while 38
(32.20% of all) works assume noiseless measurements. Only 8 works
have used bounded (non-stochastic) assumptions. Similarly for the
bounded process noise, the bounded measurement noise has started
to gain attention only recently in the CPS security domain, as we can
see from Figure 18.
Fig. 17: Distribution of primary studies by measurement noise
Fig. 18: Distribution of primary studies with bounded measurement
noise by year (partial data for 2015)
If a primary study does not consider the measurement model (e.g.
when the work is not related to the secure state estimation against
sensor attacks), we say that the measurement noise is not applicable.
Among the selected primary studies there were 6 such works.
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H. State estimation
For many situations, it may be unrealistic or unfeasible to assume
that all the states of the system are measured. In fact, 89 studies
were using some kind of state estimation, which corresponds to
75.42% of all the primary studies (see Figure 19). The most used
state estimation method is weighted least squares (WLS), found in
54 (45.76% of all) works (interestingly, all 54 studies were related to
power grids). The WLS method for power system state estimation is
optimal under Gaussian measurement noise [S057] and, in case of DC
approximation of power flow, leads to an estimator identical to the
one obtained with maximum likelihood or with minimum variance
methods [S001]. The (extended) Kalman filter was used in 21 studies
(17.80% of all primary studies), while the (extended) Luenberger
observer was used in 10 studies (8.47%), the H∞ filter in 2 studies
([S087, S093]) and the least trimmed squares estimator in only one
study ([S057]). Novel solutions for the state estimation were proposed
in 17 (14.41%) studies.
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Fig. 19: Distribution of primary studies by state estimation
Novel methods range from application-specific solutions [S024,
S072], distributed state estimation techniques for power networks
[S011, S014, S025], to generic attack-resilient solutions inspired by
Kalman filter [S091, S106, S116].
Within the domain of power grids, Giani et al. [S015] proposes
state estimation based countermeasures to coordinated sparse attacks
on power meter readings, that take advantage of graph-theoretic
construct of observable islands, which are disjoint subsets of buses
sharing the same perceived change of state [voltage phase] under
the attack. As a countermeasure to leverage point attacks against
WLS state estimation in smart grid, Tan et al. [S049] introduces a
modified robust Schweppe-Huber Generalized-M estimator. The WLS
estimation method for power networks has been extended by Liu
et al. [S054] by merging cyber impact factor matrix into the state
estimation as a reasonable adjustment of the weight values, in order
to create the abnormal traffic-indexed state estimation.
Regarding generic cyber-physical systems, to estimate the state of
the plant despite attacks on sensors and actuators, Fawzi et al. [S079]
propose an efficient state reconstructor inspired from techniques used
in compressed sensing and error correction over the real numbers. Pa-
jic et al. [S099] show that implementation issues such as jitter, latency
and synchronization errors can be mapped into parameters of the state
estimation procedure that describe modeling errors, and provides a
bound on the state-estimation error caused by modeling errors. Mo
and Sinopoli [S096] constructs an optimal estimator of a scalar state
that minimizes the “worst-case” expected cost against all possible
manipulations of measurements by the attacker, while Weimer et al.
[S102] introduces a minimum mean-squared error resilient (MMSE-
R) estimator for stochastic systems, whose conditional mean squared
error from the state remains finitely bounded and is independent of
additive measurement attacks.
Finally, for linear dynamical systems under sensor attacks, Shoukry
and Tabuada [S111] present an efficient event-triggered projected
Luenberger observer for systems under sparse attacks, and Shoukry
et al. [S117] develop an efficient algorithm that uses a Satisfiability
Modulo Theory (SMT) approach to isolate the compromised sensors
and estimate the system state despite the presence of the attack.
Together, these results are an indication that the resilient state
estimation under measurement attacks is a very active research topic
within the area of CPS security, making us reasonably confident about
its future development and potential.
I. Anomaly detector
Current state estimation algorithms use bad data detection (BDD)
schemes to detect random outliers in the measurement data [S006].
Two of the most used BDD hypothesis tests are the performance
index test (also known in power system’s community as J(xˆ)-test or
χ2-test) and the largest normalized residual test (often referred as
rNmax-test) [79].
As shown in Figure 20, among our primary studies there are
58 approaches considering performance index test, 22 approaches
dealing with normalized residual test, and 13 considering both
aforementioned hypothesis tests.
There are also two works considering an arbitrary anomaly detector
implemented by the controller and deployed to detect possible devi-
ations from the nominal behavior [S081, S101], while 36 (30.51%
of) primary studies do not deal at all with anomaly detection.
In an effort to minimize the detection delay, the change detection
can be formulated as a quickest detection problem. Page’s cumulative
sum (CUSUM) algorithm [82] is the best-known technique to tackle
this type of problem. There are 5 selected primary studies, that
propose or use a CUSUM-based attack detection schemes [S007,
S016, S035, S060, S075]. There are also 26 (22.03%) studies, that
propose other novel anomaly detection approaches, either considering
them together with the performance index test or normalized residual
test.
Fig. 20: Distribution of primary studies by anomaly detection
The novel solutions for bad data detection cover the topics of
distributed monitoring [S010, S011, S014, S029] and application-
specific anomaly detection for multi-agent distributed flocking for-
mation control [S024], automated cascade canal irrigation systems
[S072], wireless control networks, “where the network itself acts
as the controller, instead of having a specially designated node
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performing this task” [S074], multi-hop control networks, “where the
communication between sensors, actuators and computational units
is supported by a (wireless) multi-hop communication network and
data flow is performed using scheduling, routing and network coding
of sensing and actuation data” [S088], and air transportation systems
[S108].
In the power system domain, Kosut et al. [S002] proposes a
generalized likelihood ratio detector, that incorporates historical data
and does not compute explicitly the residue error, while Gu et al.
[S058] introduces a new method to detect false data injection attacks
against AC state estimation by tracking the dynamics of measurement
variations: the Kullback–Leibler distance (KL divergence, known also
as relative entropy) is used to calculate the distance between two
probability distributions derived from measurement variations.
The KL divergence is adopted also by Mo et al. [S070, S112]
in designing the optimal watermark signal in the class of stationary
Gaussian processes, which is used to derive the optimal Neyman–
Pearson detector of reply and covert attacks, respectively.
Valenzuela et al. [S031] use principal component analysis (PCA)
[83] to separate power flow variability into regular and irregular
subspaces, with the analysis of the information in the irregular
subspace determining whether the power system data has been
compromised. Also Liu et al. [S033] views false data detection as
matrix separation problem and, differently from the case of the PCA,
proposes algorithms that exploit
“the low rank structure of the anomaly-free measurement matrix,
and the fact that malicious attacks are quite sparse.”
Tiwari et al. [S097] propose an approach inspired by PCA, that
uses an invariant “– an over-approximation of the reachable states
– of the system under normal conditions as the classifier”; this set
is called the safety envelope. An alarm is raised whenever the system
state falls outside the safety envelope.
Security-oriented cyber-physical state estimation (SCPSE) for
power grid, proposed in Zonouz et al. [S026], uses stochastic infor-
mation fusion algorithms on “information provided by alerts from
intrusion detection systems that monitor the cyber infrastructure for
malicious or abnormal activity, in conjunction with knowledge about
the communication network topology and the output of a traditional
state estimator”, in order to detect intrusions and malicious data,
and to assess the cyber-physical system state.
Other novel anomaly detection methods in power grid comprise a
detector implementing the Euclidean distance metric [S048], and a
cosine similarity matching based approach [S055]. It is worth noting
that the second one requires the usage of the Kalman filter as a source
of estimated/expected data.
To contrast false data injection attacks, Sedghi and Jonckheere
[S034] present a decentralized detection and isolation scheme based
on the Markov graph of the bus phase angles, obtained via conditional
mutual information threshold (CMIT) test, while Sou et al. [S020]
introduces a scheme, that considers potentially compromised infor-
mation from both the active and the reactive power measurements on
transmission lines. In this second scheme, based on the novel reactive
power measurement residual, “the component of the proposed
residual on any particular line depends only locally on the component
of the data attack on the same line”. Li and Wang [S040] presents the
state summation detection using state variables’ distributions, which
tests hypothesis on true measurement square sum Sx (assumed to
follow normal distribution, given a large number of state variables)
together with test on J(xˆ). Finally, Sanandaji et al. [S041] presents
a heuristic for detecting abrupt changes in the system outputs based
on the singular value decomposition of a history matrix built from
system observations.
For dissipative or passive CPS, Eyisi and Koutsoukos [S098]
propose energy-based attack detection monitor.
To contrast stochastic cyber-attacks, Li et al. [S107] presents an
algebraic detection scheme based on the frequency-domain transfor-
mation technique and linear algebra theory, together with sufficient
and necessary conditions guaranteeing the detectability of such at-
tacks.
Pasqualetti et al. [S010] characterizes fundamental monitoring
limitations of descriptor systems from system-theoretic and graph-
theoretic perspectives, and designs centralized and distributed mon-
itors, which are complete, in the sense that they detect and identify
every (detectable and identifiable) attack.
Finally, Jones et al. [S113] presents an automated anomaly detec-
tion mechanism based on inference via formal methods to develop an
unsupervised learning algorithm, which constructs from data a signal
temporal logic (STL) formula that describes normal system behavior.
Trajectories that do not satisfy the learned formula are flagged as
anomalous.
As a general comment, the literature described in this section
appears quite fragmented, and a systematic high level view is still
missing even within a specific application domain. The different
results and methodologies are very difficult to relate each other and
validate since both a comparison metric and a benchmark, neither
academic nor industrial, have not been agreed and defined yet.
J. Controller
Considering the used controller, the first fact emerging from our
analysis is that studies focusing on state estimation usually do not
examine at all the controller. In fact, in 82 (69.49% of 118 selected)
studies the controller is not available. In the remainder of this section
we will focus on the remaining 36 studies, some of which consider
more than one controller at once.
As shown in Figure 21, the most considered controllers are generic
state feedback or output feedback controllers with a control law
restricted to be linear time invariant, found in 13 studies, together with
linear quadratic regulators (LQR) and H∞ (minimax) controllers,
each of which is seen in 12 works. The variations of proportional-
integral-derivative (PID) controller are considered in 7 works, while
the event-triggered and self-triggered controllers can be found in 3
studies [S085, S103, S111], and sliding mode controllers in 2 studies
[S013, S115].
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Fig. 21: Distribution of primary studies by controller
Interestingly, seven primary studies ([S024, S069, S073, S076,
S077, S086, S093]) propose novel controllers. More specifically,
inspired by the analogy to flocking behavior, Wei and Kundur
[S024] developed distributed hierarchical “control methodologies
that leverage cooperation between distributed energy resources and
traditional synchronous machines to maintain transient stability in
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the face of severe disturbances”. For a class of denial-of-service
(DoS) attack models, Amin et al. [S069] presents an optimal minimax
causal feedback control law, subject to the power, safety and security
constraints. Gupta et al. [S073] studies a similar problem of optimal
minimax control in the presence of an intelligent jammer with
limited actions as dynamic zero-sum game between the jammer
and the controller. Befekadu et al. [S076] introduces instead the
“measure transformation technique under which the observation and
state variables become mutually independent along the sample-path
(or path-estimation) of the DoS attack sequences in the system”,
thanks to which it derives the optimal control policy for the risk-
sensitive control problem, under a Markov modulated DoS attack
model. Zhu and Martı´nez [S077] proposes a variation of the receding-
horizon control law to deal with the replay attacks, while Zhu et
al. [S086] provides a set of coupled Riccati differential equations
characterizing feedback Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for
the distributed control in the multi-agent system environment subject
to cyber attacks and malicious behaviors of physical agents. Finally,
Kwon and Hwang [S093] proposes “a hybrid robust control scheme
that considers multiple sub-controllers, each matched to a specific
type of cyber attacks”, together with a method for designing the
corresponding secure switching logic.
As a general comment, the literature described in this section
derives interesting theoretical results, but there is still a lot of work
to do for addressing the practical challenges in CPS security.
K. Communication aspects and network-induced imperfections
The introduction of the communication network in a control loop
modifies the external signals of the plant and the controller due to the
network-induced imperfections [84], which in turn depend on some
communication aspects, such as transmission scheduling and routing.
When analyzing the primary studies on the basis of this facet we
got a surprise: 100 out of 118 studies (i.e., 84.75%) do not explicitly
consider any communication aspect or imperfection, while only 6
studies (i.e. 5.08%) address more than one aspect. The total number
of times each communication aspect was addressed within the set of
the primary studies is shown in Figure 22.
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Fig. 22: Distribution of primary studies by communication aspects
and network-induced imperfections
Synchronization errors are considered only by Pajic et al. [S099],
where also variable latency and time-varying sampling are mapped
into parameters of the state estimation procedure that describe mod-
eling errors. Time-varying sampling is taken into account also by
Yilmaz and Wang [S060] and, together with transmission scheduling,
by De Persis and Tesi [S103]. Limited bandwidth is considered
together with error control coding by Gupta et al. [85] (which is
related to [S073]), and by Sundaram et al. [S074], in which “nodes
in a network transmit linear combinations of incoming packets rather
than simply routing them”. Packet losses and disorder alone is
taken into consideration in two works ([S091, S118]) and together
with variable latency and transmission scheduling in another one
([S087]). Routing by itself is examined by Vukovic´ et al. [S022],
and together with error control coding, transmission scheduling and
variable latency, by D’Innocenzo et al. [S088]. Only variable latency
is considered by Miao and Zhu [S094] and by Jones et al. [S113].
Both error control coding and transmission scheduling by themselves
are taken into account in 3 works ([S079, S109, S110] and [S085,
S095, S104], respectively).
Surprisingly, very few papers (attempt to) provide non-trivial
mathematical models of the communication protocol, which indeed
is a fundamental actor of almost any CPS. In particular, only in
D’Innocenzo et al. [S088] a specific standard for communication,
i.e. WirelessHART and ISA-100, is explicitly considered in the CPS
mathematical model.
L. Time-scale model
The dynamic system behavior can be modeled via different time-
scale models, such as continuous, discrete and hybrid. In the case of
the (quasi-)steady state assumption, the system is treated as (quasi-
)static, and the time-scale model is named accordingly.
Fig. 23: Distribution of primary studies by time-scale model
As shown in Figure 23, the quasi-static model is used in 48 studies
(40.68%), all of them concerned with power systems state estimation,
while there are 13 studies (11.02%) considering continuous time,
50 (42.37%) discrete time, and only 5 considering both continuous
and discrete time ([S080, S083, S086, S103, S113], only 3 of which
actually using hybrid time [S080, S086, S113]). There is also one
work with both continuous time and quasi-static model ([S015]), and
one with both discrete time and quasi-static model ([S016]).
In particular, quasi-static analysis is mostly chosen for addressing
control architectures like SCADA, which provide steady-state set-
points to inner control loops.
M. Attacks and their characteristics
Regardless of the adopted point of view (see Section V-B), every
study on CPS security deals with attacks in order to either implement
or to counteract them. Each attack threats one or more primary
security attributes (see Section V-C). More specifically, the best
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known attack on availability is the denial of service (DoS) attack, that
renders inaccessible some or all the components of a control system
by preventing transmissions of sensor or/and control data over the
network. “To launch a DoS an adversary can jam the communication
channels, compromise devices and prevent them from sending data,
attack the routing protocols, flood with network traffic some devices,
etc.” [S069]. Attacks on data integrity are known as deception attacks
and represent the largest class of attacks on cyber-physical systems,
including false data injection attacks. The attacks on confidentiality
alone are often referred to as disclosure attacks, i.e. eavesdropping,
which is discussed only in two studies [S081, S084].
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Fig. 24: Distribution of attacks considered by primary studies
Figure 24 shows the distribution of attacks within the set of
our primary studies. The false data injection, together with generic
deception and DoS, with 57, 33 and 20 occurrences respectively,
accounts for 74.8% of all considered attacks, while the variable
structure switching, the packet scheduling, and the bias injection
attacks are considered only once.
Characterization of the attacks. Generally speaking, an attack on
control systems can be characterized by the amount of available
resources and knowledge [S081]. The resources of an adversary
can be split in disclosure resources, which enable her to obtain
sensitive information about the system during the attack by violating
data confidentiality, and disruption resources, that affect the system
operation by compromising the integrity and/or availability. The
amount of a priori knowledge regarding the control system is another
core component of the adversary model, as it may be used, for
instance, to render the attack undetectable. In the rest of Section V-M
we describe the characteristics of each type of attack individually.
In the bias injection attack, considered only by Teixeira et al.
[S081], the adversary’s goal is to inject a constant bias in the system
without being detected. No disclosure capabilities are required for
this attack, since the attack policy is open-loop. The data corruptions
may be added to both the actuator and sensor data, and the amount of
disruption resources should be above the threshold of undetectabil-
ity6. Furthermore, the open-loop attack policy requires an extensive
knowledge of the parameters of considered closed-loop system and
anomaly detector.
In the coordinated variable structure switching attack and its
extension to multi-switch attack considered in the work of Liu et al.
[S013], an opponent controls multiple circuit breakers within a power
system, and employs a local model of the system and local state
information (i.e. some knowledge of the target generator states, which
are rotor angle and frequency) to design a state-dependent breaker
switching sequence, that destabilizes target synchronous generators.
The attack on the scheduling algorithm influences the temporal
characteristics of the network, as “it results in time-varying delays
and data packets possibly received out-of-order” [S087]. To remain
stealthy, the attacker is not able to delay the packets beyond a
maximum allowable delay consistent with the network protocol in
place. On the system level, this attack does not require any a priori
knowledge of the system model, nor any disclosure resources.
The false data injection is a specific deception attack on state
estimation, introduced in the context of electric power grids by Liu et
al. [S001]. This attack on cyber-physical systems is the most studied
one. To perform it, an adversary with some knowledge of the system
topological information manipulates sensor measurements in order to
change the state variables, while bypassing existing bad data detection
schemes. This attack is based on the open-loop policy and does not
require any disclosure resources. To construct the attack vectors, a
common assumption in most works on false data injection attacks
on power system state estimation is that the attacker has complete
knowledge about the power grid topology and transmission-line
admittances. This information is abstracted in the Jacobian matrix H
[79], [87], known also as measurement or (power network) topology
matrix. By contrast, Teixeira et al. [S006] assumes the attacker only
possesses a perturbed model of the power system, “such a model
may correspond to a partial model of the true system, or even an out-
dated model” [S006]. In this way it quantifies a trade-off between
the accuracy of the model known by adversary and possible attack
impact for different BDD schemes, showing that “the more accurate
model the attacker has access to, the larger deception attack he can
perform undetected” [S006]. Similarly, Rahman and Mohsenian-
Rad [S027] argues that “a realistic false data injection attack is
essentially an attack with incomplete information due to the attackers
lack of real-time knowledge with respect to various grid parameters
and attributes such as the position of circuit breaker switches and
transformer tap changers and also because of the attacker’s limited
physical access to most grid facilities”, and presents a vulnerability
measure for topologies of power grids subject to attacks based on
incomplete information. On the same line, Bi and Zhang [S017]
derives a necessary and sufficient condition to perform undetectable
false data injection attack with partial topological information and
develops a min-cut method to design the optimal attack, which
requires the minimum knowledge of system topology. Finally, the
problem of constructing a blind false data injection attacks without
explicit prior knowledge of the power grid topology is studied by
Esmalifalak et al. [S012], Kim et al. [S051], and Yu and Chin
6In other words, the attacker should have enough resources to construct an
unobservable attack; a good example of the amount of disruption resources
above the threshold of undetectability in the context of power transmission
networks is given by the security index [86], defined as minimum number of
measurements an attacker needs to compromise, in order to attack measure-
ment k without being detected.
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[S052]. In Esmalifalak et al. [S012] attackers try to make inferences
through phasor observations applying linear independent component
analysis (ICA) technique. However, such technique requires that loads
are statistically independent and non-Gaussian, and the technique
need full sensor observations [S051]. Kim et al. [S051] instead
proposes subspace methods, which requires no system parameter
information. In this case the attack can be launched with only
partial sensor observations. Yu and Chin [S052] proposes to use
principal component analysis (PCA) approximation method without
the assumption regarding the distribution of state variables, to perform
the same task of making inferences from the correlations of the line
measurements, in order to construct the blind false data injection
attack. Differently from the works on undetectable false data injection
attacks on power grids summarized up to here, Qin et al. [S036]
presents an unidentifiable version of this attack, in which the control
center can detect that there are bad or malicious measurements, but
it cannot identify which meters have been compromised.
A special type of false data injection attack on electric power
grid is the load redistribution attack, in which only load bus power
injection and line power flow measurements are attackable [S008]. It
consists in increasing load at some buses and reducing loads at other
buses, while maintaining the total load unchanged, in order to hide the
attack from bad data detection. The construction of load redistribution
attack relies on topological information of the network, that can
be derived from the Jacobin matrix H. Considering the practical
issue that an attacker can only obtain the parameter information of
a limited number of lines, Liu et al. [S043] presents a strategy to
determine optimal local attacking region, that requires the minimum
network parameter information. The undetectability is obtained by
“making sure that the variations of phase angles of all boundary
buses connected to the same island of the nonattacking region are
the same” [S043].
The data framing attack is a deception attack on power system
state estimation that exploits current bad data detection and removal
mechanisms. It purposely triggers the bad data detection mechanism
and frames some normally operating meters as sources of bad data
such that their data will be removed. After such data removal,
although the remaining data appear to be consistent with the system
model, the resulting state estimate may have an arbitrarily large error
[S037]. Also this attack does not require any disclosure resources,
since the attack policy is open-loop. By applying the subspace
methods presented in 2015 by Kim et al. [S051] to learn the system
operating subspace from measurements, the data framing can be
performed without knowledge of the Jacobian matrix H. A limited a
priori knowledge required consists of a basis matrix U of a subspace
of all possible noiseless measurements R of H.
The leverage point attack is a deception attack which creates
leverage points within the factor space of the (power system) state
estimation regression model [S049]. The residual of the measurement
corresponded with the leverage point is very small even when it is
contaminated with a very large error. Thus the adversary can freely
introduce arbitrary errors into the meter measurements without being
detected. This attack is based on an open-loop policy and thus does
not require disclosure resources. However, to be fully effective, it
requires a complete knowledge of the Jacobian matrix H and amount
of disruption resources above the threshold of undetectability [S057].
The load altering attack against power grid’s demand response and
demand side management programs can bring down the grid or cause
significant damage to the power transmission and user equipment. It
consists in an attempt to control and change (usually increase) certain
load types in order to damage the grid through circuit overflow or
disturbing the balance between power supply and demand [S018].
The static load altering is mainly concerned in changing the volume
of the load. Here the attacker without any prior knowledge of the
plant model uses some historical data to impose a pre-programmed
trajectory to the victim load (an open-loop policy). In the more
advanced dynamic load altering attack, presented in 2015 by Amini
et al. [S050], the adversary “constantly monitors the grid conditions
through the attacker’s installed sensors so that it can adjust the
attack trajectory based on the current conditions in the power grid”
[S050]. With this closed-loop policy, the attacker having a complete
knowledge of the plant’s model controls the victim load based on a
feedback from the power system frequency and can make the power
system unstable, without the need for increasing the scope or volume
of the attack, compared to a static scenario.
The attacks at physical layer range from attacks that affect both
the physical infrastructure and the control network (of power grids)
[S053] to attacks through physical layer interactions, such as an
attack on vehicle platoon traveling at a constant speed, presented
by Dadras et al. [S115]. The attack studied by Soltan et al. [S053]
physically disconnects some power lines within the attacked zone
(which is defined as a set of buses, power lines, phasor measurement
units (PMUs) and an associated phasor data concentrator (PDC)
[87]) and disallows the information from the PMUs within the
zone to reach the control center. This attack does not require any
knowledge of the plant model, nor disclosure resources. The attack
on vehicle platoons [S115] is carried out by a maliciously controlled
vehicle, who attempts to destabilize or take control of the platoon
by combining changes to the gains of the associated law with the
appropriate vehicle movements. This closed-loop attack “bears some
resemblance to an insider version of the replay attack of [S010], in
that the attacker is part of the CPS and is therefore able inject control
inputs legitimately”.
In topology poisoning attack an adversary covertly alters data from
certain meters, network switches and line breakers to mislead the
control center with an incorrect network topology. Kim and Tong
[S028] shows that under certain conditions even in a local information
regime, where the attacker has only local information from those
meters it has gained control, undetectable topology poisoning attacks
exist and can be implemented easily based on simple heuristics. Deka
et al. [S039] proves that grids completely protected by secure mea-
surements are also vulnerable to hidden topology poisoning attacks,
if the adversary armed only with generic information regarding the
grid structure can corrupt the breaker statuses on transmission lines
and jam the communication of flow measurements on the attacked
lines.
The zero dynamics attack, first considered in [90], [91], is one
in which an adversary constructs an open-loop policy such that the
attack signal produces no output. In other words, “these attacks are
decoupled from the plant output yk, thus being stealthy with respect
to arbitrary anomaly detectors” [S081]. For an attacker with limited
disruption resources, zero dynamics attacks are based on the perfect
(local) knowledge of the plant dynamics. In this setting, Teixeira et
al. [S083] shows that zero-dynamics attacks may not be completely
stealthy since they require the system to be at a non-zero initial
condition; however for the subset of attacks exciting unstable zero-
dynamics, the effect of initial condition mismatch in terms of the
resulting increase in the output energy can be made arbitrarily small
while still affecting the system performance. We should notice that an
adversary capable of changing all the measurements can, of course,
force the system’s output to zero without any knowledge of the model,
initial state and nominal input. Furthermore, for a linear not left-
invertible system, the knowledge of the initial state is not required,
because an attacker can exploit the kernel of the transfer matrix and
the linearity of the system.
With the covert attack, also known as a covert misappropriation
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of the plant [S078], an adversary can gain control of the plant
in a manner that cannot be detected by the controller. This attack
requires high levels of system knowledge and the ability of attacker
to both read and replace communicated signals within the control
loop, indeed “the covert agent is assumed to have the resources
to read and add to both the control actuation commands and the
output measurements. In practice, this could also be accomplished
by augmenting the physical actuators or modifying the sensors.
Examples of such modifications include installing a controlled-flow
bypass around a sluice gate in an irrigation system and connecting a
controlled voltage source between a voltage measuring device and its
intended connection point in an electrical network. Another potential
mode of attack would involve corrupting the PLCs used by the
nominal controller to implement the control and sensing operations”
[S078]. Pasqualetti et al. [S010] observe that the covert attack can be
seen as a feedback version of the replay attack, while Smith [S078]
examines also the effects of lower levels of system knowledge and
nonlinear plants on the ability to detect a covert misappropriation of
the plant.
The replay attack is a deception attack (possibly combined with
a physical attack), in which an adversary first gathers sequences of
measurement and/or control data, and then replays the recorded data
while injecting an exogenous signal into the system [S081]. The
adversary requires no knowledge of the system model to generate
stealthy outputs. However, the attacker needs to have “enough
knowledge of the system model to design an input that may achieve its
malicious objective, such as physically damaging the plant” [S070].
The model of this attack is inspired by the Stuxnet [17] example.
A generic deception attack is an attack on data integrity, where an
adversary sends false information from (one or more) sensors or/and
controllers in order to deceive a compromised system’s component
into believing that a received false data is valid or true [S071].
Usually it is modeled as an arbitrary additive signal injected to
override the original data. Since generic deception attacks can be
used to represent also other, more specialized deception attacks,
they are considered mostly in the studies adopting the defender’s
point of view, presented in Section V-B. There are 23 (19.49% of
all) studies using a generic deception attack model only to develop
some defense strategy. The remaining 10 primary studies present
(generic) deception attacks, that are different from any other attack
considered above. Vrakopoulou et al. [S005] deals with a cyber-attack
on the automatic generation control (AGC) signal in multi-area power
system as a controller synthesis problem, where the objective is to
drive the system outside the safety margins. It investigates two cases
according to whether the attacker has perfect model knowledge or
not, and provides different alternatives for attack synthesis, ranging
from “open loop approaches, based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) optimization, to close loop schemes based on feedback
linearization and gain scheduling” [S005]. Always within power
grids’ application domain, Vukovic´ and Da´n [S029] consider a sophis-
ticated adversary, that knows the system model and aims to disable
the state-of-the-art distributed state estimation by preventing it from
converging. To this end, he or she compromises the communication
infrastructure of a single control center in an interconnected power
system, in order to manipulate the exchanged data (i.e. state variables)
used as an input to the state estimator. The stealthy cyber attacks that
maximize the error in unmanned aerial systems’ state estimation are
studied in Kwon et al. [S082]. To consider the worst-case security
problem, this study assumes the attacker has the perfect knowledge
on the system model and can compromise sensors and/or actuators.
The attacks on both sensors and actuators by the adversary with a
perfect knowledge of the static parameters of a CPS (modeled as a
discrete LTI system equipped with a Kalman filter, LQG controller
and χ2 failure detector) are considered also by Mo and Sinopoli
[S071], where the adversary’s strategy is formulated as a constrained
control problem. Djouadi et al. [S100] instead present optimal sensor
signal attacks for the observer-based finite and infinite horizon linear
quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding
cost functions. Also this study assumes full-information, i.e. the
system parameters are known to the adversary. Zhang et al. [S104]
studies stealthy deception attacks on remote state estimation with
communication rate constraints. Here the deception attacker intrudes
the sensor, learns its online transmission strategy and then modifies
the event-based sensor transmission schedule, in order to degrade
the estimation quality. For the domain of electricity market, Jia et
al. [S062] studies the average relative perturbation of the real-time
locational marginal price as an optimization problem; the adversary
is assumed to have not only the perfect knowledge of the system
model, but also the possibility to access the measurement values in
real-time, in order to inject bad data that is state independent, partially
adaptive, or even fully adaptive. A stealthy deception scheme capable
of compromising the performance of the automated cascade canal
irrigation systems is presented by Amin et al. [S072]. This attack
scheme is based on approximate knowledge of canal hydrodynamics
and is implemented via switching the linearized shallow water partial
differential equation parameters and proportional boundary control
actions, to withdraw water from the pools through offtakes. Similarly,
the stealthy deception attacks on process control systems performed
by a very powerful adversary with knowledge of the exact linear
model of the plant, the parameters of anomaly detector and control
command signals, are presented by Ca´rdenas et al. [S075]. In the
most sophisticated attack considered in this study, adversaries “try
to shift the behavior of the system very discretely at the beginning of
the attack and then maximize the damage after the system has been
moved to a more vulnerable state” [S075]. Finally, for a single-
input single-output plant, Bai et al. [S101] analytically characterizes
an optimal stealthy attack strategy, that maximizes the estimation
error of the Kalman filter by tampering with the control input, as a
function of the system parameters, noise statistics and information
available to the attacker.
From such literature a systematic characterization of “types” of
attack is emerging, even if the “generic deception attack” and “false
data injection attack” have been primarily addressed.
N. Attack scheme
In this section we distinguish the selected studies based on whether
they consider centralized, distributed or local attack strategies. The
distribution of studies based on this facet is shown in Figure 25.
The overwhelming majority of primary studies (102, 86.44%)
considers only near omniscient adversary, capable of compromising
several system components in a centralized fashion, while there are
only 6 (5.17%) studies that study distributed attacks ([S010, S013,
S014, S024, S025, S086]), and 13 (11.02%) studies dealing with local
attacks ([S005, S013, S019, S025, S028, S029, S043, S044, S074,
S084, S086, S104, S115]).
It is clear from this data that distributed and local solutions require
more attention.
O. Plant model used by the attacker
This facet characterizes a modeling framework used by an adver-
sary to design an attack on a CPS. Since attacker’s knowledge of the
control system and plant model can be limited or absent, an adversary
may rely on a model of plant that is different from the actual model
used by a system operator. Here our focus is on such cases, Figure 26
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Fig. 26: Distribution of primary studies by plant model used by an
attacker
shows the distribution of the primary studies by plant model used by
an attacker.
In 101 studies (85.59%) it is assumed that the attacker uses the
same model of the plant as the system operator, while in 14 studies
(11.86%) the adversary does not use any model of plant. In the
remaining 3 studies (2.54%) the attacker uses a model of plant that
is simpler than the one used by operator. In particular, in the works
of Kim, Tong and Thomas [S037, S051] data framing attacks on
power transmission system are designed using a linearized system. It
is shown that such attacks can successfully perturb a nonlinear “state
estimate, and the attacker is able to control the degree of perturbation
as desired” [S037]. This is an answer on the question on “whether
attacks constructed from a linear model is effective in a nonlinear
system” [S051]. Liang, Kosut and Sankar [S044] studies both DC
and AC attack models to construct the false data injection in AC
state estimation, showing that the DC attack is detectable when the
injected values are too large, while the AC attack model permits to
“hide the attack completely” [S044].
P. Defense scheme
Similarly to attack schemes, we differentiate the studies also based
on whether the proposed approach to defend a CPS focuses on the
local or global scale of the system. In case of the global scale,
this dimension also specifies whether a defense mechanism uses
centralized or distributed coordination model.
We recall from Section V-B that there are 28 primary studies
adopting only an adversary’s point of view and not concerned with
countermeasures against attacks. We say that for them the defense
schemes are not available. The distribution of remaining (90, i.e.
76.27% of all) primary studies by defense scheme is shown in
Figure 27.
Most of the studies (74) on defense mechanisms uses only cen-
tralized scheme, while the local scale is considered only in 4 works
Fig. 27: Distribution of primary studies by defense scheme
( [88] and [89], related to [S010] and [S013], respectively, together
with [S020], where also the centralized scheme is taken into account,
and [S105]). Distributed approaches are examined in 13 works (alone
in [S011, S014, S024, S029, S034, S084, S086, S100, S108, S110]
and together with centralized ones in [S010, S025, S060]). We
must point out that according to our selection strategy we do not
consider the studies focused on the typical distributed problem of
reaching consensus in the presence of malicious agents [90], [91];
this is because in these works the dynamics is part of the consensus
algorithm and can be specifically designed, rather than being given
as in a physical system [S058].
This data suggests that distributed and local defense solutions
require more attention.
Q. Defense strategy
We have already anticipated in Section V-B that countermeasures
against attacks, i.e. actions minimizing the risk of threats, are pre-
sented in more than three-fourth of primary studies, and occupy the
central spot of the research efforts. The defense strategies can be
classified as prevention, detection, and mitigation [92]; following the
line of the fault diagnosis literature [93], we advocate isolation as a
further defense strategy extending detection approaches.
Prevention aims at decreasing the likelihood of attacks by reducing
the vulnerability of the system [92]. It brings together all the actions
performed offline, before the system is perturbed or attacked. There
are 43 studies (36.44%) studying prevention mechanisms. These
studies range from security metrics for the vulnerability analysis of
systems or their critical components to design and analysis of resilient
state estimators and controllers capable to withstand some attacks,
and protection-based approaches aiming to identify and secure some
strategic distributed components. Figure 28 shows the distribution of
the primary studies focussing on prevention.
Twenty studies present protection-based approaches. Among
them, 6 studies discuss the secure sensor allocation against unde-
tectable false data injection attacks in power transmission networks.
More specifically, Bobba et al. [S003] show that it is necessary
and sufficient to protect a set of basic measurements (in number
equal to number of all the unknown state variables in the state
estimation problem) to ensure that no such attack can be launched,
while Giani et al. [S015] proof that placing p + 1 secure phasor
measurement units (PMUs) at carefully chosen buses are sufficient
to neutralize any collection of p sparse attacks, and Kim and Tong
[S028] present a so-called cover-up protection that identifies the set
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Fig. 28: Distribution of primary studies by prevention approach
of meters that need to be secured so an undetectable attack does not
exist for any target topology. Also Yang et al. [S016] identify the
critical meters to protect and observes that the meters measuring
bus injection powers play a more important role than the ones
measuring the transmission line power flows, since they are essential
in determining a specific state variable, while the measurements of
line power flows are redundant to improve the accuracy of state
estimation. As finding the minimum number of protected sensors such
that an adversary cannot inject false data without being detected is
NP-hard7 [S003], Kim and Poor [S009] and Deka et al. [S038] present
greedy algorithms to select a subset of measurements to be protected.
To validate the correctness of customers’ energy usage by detecting
anomaly activities at the consumption level in the power distribution
network, Lo and Ansari [S032] present “a hybrid anomaly intrusion
detection system framework, which incorporates power information
and sensor placement along with grid-placed sensor algorithms
using graph theory to provide network observability.” To reveal
zero-dynamics attacks, Teixeira et al. [S083] provide necessary and
sufficient conditions on modifications of the CPS’s structure and
presents an algorithm to deploy additional measurements to this end,
while Bopardikar and Speranzon [S089] develop design strategies
that can prevent or make stealth attacks difficult to be carried out;
the proposed modifications of the legacy control system include
optimal allocation of countermeasures and design of augmented
system using a Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse. Mohsenian-Rad and
Leon-Garcia [S018] discuss the defense mechanisms against static
load altering attacks and presents a cost-efficient load protection
design problem minimizing the cost of protection while ensuring that
the remaining unprotected load cannot cause circuit overflow or any
other major harm to the electric grid. For electricity market domain,
Esmalifalak et al. [S065] use a two-person zero-sum game model to
obtain an equilibrium solution in protecting different measurements
against false data injection attacks impacting locational marginal
price (LMP). Within the same domain, Ma et al. [S068] consider a
multiact dynamic game where the attacker can jam a reduced number
of signal channels carrying measurement information in order to
manipulate the LMP creating an opportunity for gaining profit, and
the defender is able to guarantee a limited number of channels in
information delivery. Other protection-based approaches include, for
instance “intentionally switch on/off one of the selected transmission
lines by turns, and therefore change the system topology” [S042];
dynamically change the set of measurements considered in state
estimation and the admittances of a set of lines in the topology
in a controlled fashion [S047], that is an application of a moving
target defense (MTD) paradigm; use covert topological information
by keeping the exact reactance of a set of transmission lines secret,
possibly jointly with securing some meter measurements [S017];
use an algebric criterion to reconfigure and partition a Jacobian
7since this problem is reducible to the hitting set problem
matrix H into two sub-matrices, on each of which to perform a
corresponding residual test [S021]; use graph partition algorithms to
decompose a power system into several subsystems, where false data
do not have enough space to hide behind normal measurement errors
[S030]; or even use voltage stability index [94] to identify nodes in
power distribution networks with similar levels of vulnerabilities to
false data injection attacks via a hybrid clustering algorithm [S056];
“employ a coding matrix to the original sensor outputs to increase
the estimation residues, such that the alarm will be triggered by the
detector even under intelligent data injection attacks” [S109], under
the assumption that the attacker does not know the coding matrix
yet. Finally, in order to detect and isolate the disconnected lines and
recover the phase angles, in front of the joint cyber and physical
attack [S053] outlined in Section V-M, Soltan et al. [S053] present
an algorithm that partitions the power grid into the minimum number
of attack-resilient zones, ensuring the proposed online methods are
guaranteed to succeed.
Then, the four over five resilient controllers [S069, S073, S076,
S077] and nine over ten state estimators [S015, S049, S054, S091,
S096, S099, S102, S111, S116] presented in the primary studies were
already described in the end of Sections V-J and V-H, respectively.
The only works not discussed there are Bezzo et al. [S114] and
Mishra et al. [S110]. The first one builds an algorithm that leverages
the theory of Markov decision processes to determine the optimal
policy to plan the motion of unmanned vehicles and avoid unsafe
regions of a state space despite the attacks on sensor measurements,
when “the system is fully observable and at least one measurement
(however unknown) returns a correct estimate of a state” [S114],
while in the second study the state estimation is performed in a private
and secure manner across multiple computing nodes (observers) with
an approach inspired by techniques in cryptography, i.e. decoding
Reed-Solomon codes, and results from estimation theory, such as
Cramer-Rao lower bound, as a guarantee on the secrecy of the plant’s
state against corrupting observers [S110]. Finally, Shoukry et al.
[S087] present a minimax state estimator and controller design
as a defense against packet scheduling attacks.
There are 8 works presenting security metrics, such as security
indices defined in the context of power networks as a minimum num-
ber of meters to perform an unobservable attack whether including
[S004] or not [S002] a given meter, and -stealthiness, which is
a notion that quantifies the difficulty to detect an attack when an
arbitrary detection algorithm is implemented by the controller [S101].
A vulnerability measure for topologies of power grids subject to false
data injection attacks based on incomplete information is presented
by Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad [S027], while the vulnerability of
the power system state estimator to attacks performed against the
communication infrastructure is analyzed by Vukovic´ et al. [S022] via
security metrics that quantify the importance of individual substations
and the cost of attacking individual measurements in terms of number
of substations that have to be attacked. For the domain of electricity
market, Jia et al. [S062] introduces the average relative price per-
turbation as a measure of a system-wide price perturbation resulting
from a deception attack described in Section V-M. In the context
of canonical double-integrator-network (DIN) model of autonomous
vehicle networks, to reflect the quality of the adversary’s estimate
of the desired nonrandom statistics Xue et al. [S084] defines “the
error covariance for a minimum-variance-unbiased estimate of the
initial-condition vector as the security level matrix” and considers
its scalar measures as security levels characterizing the confidentiality
of network’s state. Finally, Kwon and Hwang [S090] consider the
dynamic behavior cost and estimation error costs to analytically test
the behavior of unmanned aerial systems under various deception
attacks and quantify their severity accordingly.
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The distribution of primary studies between offline and online
defense strategies is shown in Figure 29, while the distribution of
studies by online defense strategy is reported in Figure 30.
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Fig. 29: Distribution of primary studies between defense strategies
The online approaches come into play after adversarial events
happen [S080]. Detection is an online approach in which the system
is continuously monitored for anomalies caused by adversary actions
[92], in order to decide whether an attack has occurred. Attack
isolation is one step beyond attack detection, since it distinguishes
between different types of attacks [93], and requires also that the
exact location(s) of the compromised components(s) be identified
[S020]. Once an anomaly or attack is detected (and isolated), miti-
gation actions may be taken to disrupt and neutralize the attack, thus
reducing its impact [92].
Fig. 30: Distribution of primary studies by online defense strategy
Among the 51 studies concerned with online defenses, 16 are
focused on detection only, other 16 on detection and isolation, while
8 on detection, isolation and mitigation. There are 9 works studying
mitigation only, and two works on isolation and mitigation [S036,
S085].
To contrast unidentifiable false data injection, Qin et al. [S036]
present an algorithm to enumerate all feasible cases and proposes a
mitigation strategy to minimize the average damage to the system.
Another work on isolation and mitigation is Foroush and Martı´nez
[S085], which introduces joint identification and control strategy, that
renders the system asymptotically stable in front of unknown periodic
DoS in form of pulse-width modulated jamming attacks.
Three of the works focused on mitigation were already described
in previous Sections (i.e. [S079] in V-H, [S086] and [S093] in V-J).
Here we spend some words on the remaining 5 studies. Liu et
al. [S013] recalls their study of strategies to be “employed by a
power system operator in the face of a switching attack to steer
the system to a stable equilibrium through persistent co-switching
and by leveraging the existence of a stable sliding mode” [89].
Zhu and Bas¸ar [S080] presents a cross-layer, hybrid dynamic game-
theoretic model that captures the coupling between the cyber and
the physical layers of the system dynamics, extending the control
and defense strategy designs “to incorporate post-event system
states, where resilient control and cyber strategies are developed to
deal with uncertainties and events that are not taken into account
in pre-event robustness and security designs” [S080]. The overall
optimal design of the cyber-physical system is characterized here by a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation, together with a Shapley optimality
criterion. Yuan et al. [S118] uses this model to construct a hierarchical
Stackelberg game, in order to design a control strategy resilient to
DoS launched by the intelligent attacker, which adjusts its strategy
according to the knowledge of the defender’s security profile. Also
Barreto et al. [S092] studies a game-theory problem (via differential
games and heuristic stability games) where the actions of the players
are the control signals each of them has access to. It focuses on
reactive security mechanisms, which change the control actions in
response to attacks. Another game-theoretic study is Liu et al.
[S105], in which the objective of the defender is to guarantee the
dynamic performance of the networked control system (NCS) by
transmitting signals with higher power levels than that of jammer’s
noisy signals. The cost function of the proposed two-player zero-
sum stochastic game includes “not only the resource costs used to
conduct cyber-layer defense or attack actions, but also the dynamic
performance (indexed by quadratic state errors) of the NCS” [S105].
To contrast the DoS attacks characterized by their frequency and
duration, De Persis and Tesi [S103] determines suitable scheduling
of the transmission times achieving input-to-state stability (ISS) of
the closed-loop system. It considers periodic, event-based and self-
triggering implementation of sampling logics, all of which adapt the
sampling rate to the occurrence of DoS and, sometimes, to the closed-
loop behavior.
Regarding detection mechanisms, most of all related works were
already described in Section V-I. Here we introduce the remaining
ones.
In order to detect a zero dynamics attack, Keller et al. [S091]
proposes to destroy the stealthy strategy of the attacker by trig-
gering data losses on the control signals corrupted by the attack
and to use the (augmented state version of) intermittent unknown
input Kalman filter. For a system equipped with multiple con-
trollers/estimators/detectors, such that each combination of these
components constitute a subsystem, Miao and Zhu [094] presents
a moving-horizon approach to solve a zero-sum hybrid stochastic
game and obtain a saddle-point equilibrium policy for balancing the
system’s security overhead and control cost, since each subsystem has
a probability to detect specific types of attacks with different control
and detection costs. In the power systems domain, Hao et al. [S046]
takes advantage of the sparse and low rank properties of the block
measurements for a time interval to make use of robust PCA with
element-wise constraints to improve both the error tolerance and the
capability of detecting false data with partial observations.
The detection and identification of false data injection attacks
on power transmission systems is considered by Davis et al. [S019],
which outlines an “observe and perturb methodology” to compare
the expected results of a control action with the observed response
of the system, while Ozay et al. [S025] use a modified version of
normalized residual test coupled with proposed state vector estimation
methods against sparse attacks. Assuming the attack signal enters
through the electro-mechanical swing dynamics of the synchronous
generators in the grid as an unknown additive disturbance, Nudell
et al. [S059] divide the grid into coherent areas via “phasor-based
model reduction algorithm by which a dynamic equivalent of the
clustered network can be identified in real-time”, and localizes which
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area the attack may have entered using relevant information extracted
from the phasor measurement data.
R. Theoretical foundation
Because of the intrinsic multidisciplinary nature of cyber-physical
systems, we payed attention also on the theoretical background on
which primary studies are built upon. Since the control systems are
at the heart of CPS, it isn’t a surprise that control theory is used in
every study considered in our mapping study. The distribution of other
theoretical backgrounds considered by primary studies is presented
in Figure 31.
Stackelberg game
Nonzero-sum (differential) game
Semidefinite programming
Formal methods
Quadratic programming
Nonlinear progrmaming
Compressed sensing
Machine learning and statistics
Zero-sum (differential) game
Information theory
Dynamica programming
Integer programming
Computational complexity theory
Linear programming
Convex optimization
Graph theory
0 10 20 30 40
2
2
3
3
5
6
7
7
7
8
10
10
11
16
19
34
Fig. 31: Distribution of theoretical backgrounds considered by pri-
mary studies
The study of graphs [95], [96] is the most used theoretical
foundation, found in 34 studies (28.81%), that are [S002, S004,
S009-S011, S014-S017, S020, S022-S024, S026-S030, S032, S034,
S037-S039, S042, S045, S051, S053, S059, S062, S074, S084, S086,
S088, S100]. Graph theory is well suited to represent any kind of
networks, and, in fact, it was used in 26 studies on security of power
transmission networks.
To asymptotically analyze the intrinsic difficulty of problems and
algorithms and to decide which of these are likely to be tractable,
computational complexity theory [95], [97] is employed in 11 works,
all within the field of power transmission ([S001-S004, S010, S015,
S016, S032, S038, S039, S053]).
Information theory [98] is used in 8 works ( [85], related to [S073],
and [S018, S024, S074, S079, S101, S110, S116]), most of which
treating the security of generic linear dynamical systems.
The methods of dimensionality reduction (such as principal com-
ponent analysis) and of latent variable separation (e.g. independent
component analysis) from machine learning and statistics provide
a way to understand and visualize the structure of complex data
sets [83] and are used in 7 works ([S012, S031, S033, S052, S056,
S097, S113]). Their application domain is power grids and generic
dynamical systems.
Other methods of linear dimensionality reduction are used for
simultaneous sensing and compression of finite-dimensional vectors.
Providing means for recovering sparse high-dimensional signals from
highly incomplete measurements by using efficient algorithms [99],
compressed sensing is applied in 7 works on power grids and linear
dynamical systems ([S004, S009, S025, S033, S046, S079, S111]).
Starting from 2014, typical formal methods concepts of signal
temporal logic (STL, which is a rigorous formalism for specifying
desired behaviors of continuous signals [100]) and satisfiability mod-
ulo theories (SMT) [101] have found their way in 3 studies on CPS
security ([S113] and [S047, S117], respectively), with applications
to anomaly detection and resilient state estimation in generic cyber-
physical systems and power grids.
The mathematical optimization [97], [102] is used in several studies
and application areas. The sub-fields of optimization found in primary
studies include convex optimization (19 studies), linear programming
(16 studies), dynamic programming and integer programming (both
appeared in 10 studies), nonlinear programming (6 studies), quadratic
programming (adopted in 5 works) and semidefinite programming (3
studies).
The most used sub-field of game theory [103], found in 7 primary
studies, is zero-sum game, which do not allow for any cooperation
between the players, since what one player gains incurs a loss to
the other player ([S065, S068, S073, S080, S087, S094, S105]).
Both non-zero sum games and Stackelberg games are formulated in
2 works ([S086, S092] and [104], related to [S077], together with
[S118], respectively). As expected, all these games belong to a class
of continuous-time infinite dynamic games, also known as differential
games, wherein the evolution of the state is described by a differential
equation and the players act throughout a time interval.
VI. RESULTS - VALIDATION STRATEGIES (RQ3)
We determined the research type and related research methods
of each primary study, simulation models, simulation test systems
and experimental testbeds used, repeatability and availability of
replication package. In the following we describe the main facts
emerging from the collected data.
A. Research type and related research methods
Following the guidelines of systematic mapping studies [9], we
reuse the classification of research approaches proposed by Wieringa
et al. [105], applying the research type classification presented in
Petersen et al. [9]. It is worth noting that our selection strategy
(see Section III-C) focusses on studies proposing a method or
technique for cyber-physical system security, so the philosophical
papers, opinion papers and experience papers are not considered in
our study. The distribution of primary studies by research type is
presented in Figure 32.
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Fig. 32: Distribution of primary studies by research type
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Validation research is applied in 87 studies (73.73%), where the
techniques investigated are novel and have not yet been implemented
in practice; the research methods used are formal mathematical
proofs, case studies and lab experiments, together with simulations
as a means for conducting an empirical study. In particular, formal
mathematical proofs are used in 63 studies (53.39%), in 5 of which as
the only validation method adopted. There are 18 primary studies pro-
viding both mathematical proofs and illustrative numerical examples,
and 14 works illustrating formal mathematical proofs and examples
applied to simulation test systems. Case studies via simulation,
understood as empirical inquiries that draw on multiple sources of
evidence to investigate contemporary phenomena in their real-life
context, especially when the boundary between phenomenon and
context cannot be clearly specified [57], are employed in 4 studies,
twice as validation of a good line of argumentation [S026, S114],
and twice as a follow up of formal mathematical reasoning [S082,
S088]. It is worth noting that in Bezzo et al. [S114] also a hardware
evaluation on a remotely controlled flying quadricopter is performed,
while the case study of D’Innocenzo et al. [S088] is extracted from
its previous work cited therein [106]. Another validation research
approach, considered in 46 primary studies, consists of an experiment,
that is a formal, rigorous and controlled empirical investigation,
where one factor or variable of the studied setting is manipulated,
while all the other parameters are regulated at fixed levels [57]. Most
of these experiments are performed in simulation: the experimental
testbeds are employed only in 7 of these 46 works. As shown in
Figure 33, the quadruple-tank process [107], that is a multivariable
laboratory process consisting of four interconnected water tanks, is
used in 3 primary studies [S081, S083, S107]. LandShark8 robot,
i.e. a fully electric unmanned ground vehicle developed by Black I
Robotics, is used in other 3 works [S097, S099, S106]. Finally, micro
grid experimental testbed consisting of three Siemens SENTRON
PAC4200 smart meters connected into the network with YanHua
Industry control machine, which is used to monitor all traffic of lab
network and read the data from all meters, is used only in one primary
study [S054]. The remaining 39 works that use experiments as a
validation method are employing different simulation test systems,
described in Section VI-C. Notably, simulation experiments follow
a good line of argumentation of the rest of the paper in 21 primary
studies, while in the remaining 18 works the experiments are coupled
with formal mathematical proofs.
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Fig. 33: Distribution of experimental testbeds found in primary
studies
Then, in 30 (i.e. 25.42% of all) studies solution proposals for
specific problems are given, where the potential benefits and the
applicability of a solution is simply shown through a small example
or a line of argumentation; those solutions are either novel or a
significant extension of existing ones. We want to point out that often
this category corresponds to the results of theoretical research. There
8http://www.blackirobotics.com/LandShark UGV UC0M.html
are 2 primary studies that use only a good line of argumentation
[S014, S069], while sound argument is followed by an illustrative
numerical example in 6 primary studies ([S050, S092, S096, S100,
S104, S109]), or by an example applied to simulation test system in
22 works. The different simulation test systems found in our primary
studies are described in Section VI-C.
Finally, evaluation research, where the techniques are implemented
in practice with identification of problems in industry, is done only
in one study [S072], in which the Gignac irrigation canal network is
used to demonstrate the feasibility of stealthy deception attacks on
water SCADA systems.
B. Simulation model
As in the case of plant models used by attackers, also the plant
models adopted for simulation purposes can be different from the
plant models used in the analysis. As we can see from Figure 34,
an overwhelming majority of primary studies uses the same model
of plant for both the analysis and simulation, while only in 6
studies (5.08%) these models are different [S028, S030, S051, S057,
S062, S067]. Those six studies are within the power transmission or
electricity market application domains and use nonlinear AC model
for simulation, while consider a DC model (sometimes together
with AC model) for analysis purposes. It is worth to mention
that in 32 primary studies there are no simulations. Those works
account for those solution proposals and validation research papers
already described in Subsection VI-A that use only good line of
argumentation, formal mathematical proofs and illustrative numerical
examples as the research methods. The only exception is Tiwari et
al. [S097], which uses LandShark robot as the experimental testbed,
without relying on simulations.
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Fig. 34: Distribution of primary studies by simulation model
C. Simulation test system
As it was anticipated in the previous section, 85 primary studies
(72,03%) use simulation test systems to validate the presented results.
Within the power systems application domains, the simulation tool
used in all but one primary study is MatPower [108]. The distribution
of its test cases is shown in Figure 35.
The works studying applications to electricity market use a modi-
fied 5-bus PJM example (MatPower case5) [109], which is employed
in 3 primary studies, and IEEE 14-bus (case14), IEEE 30-bus
(case30), IEEE 118-bus (case118) test systems. Generally speaking,
IEEE 14-bus test system is the most used one, found in 38 works,
treating mostly power transmission (in 34 studies), but also power
generation (in 2 studies) and electricity market (in 8 studies). IEEE
30-bus test system is used in 17 primary studies, 16 of which are
focused on power transmission only, and the remaining one on
electricity market. IEEE 118-bus test system is second most adopted
one, found in 29 primary studies, dealing power transmission (in 27
studies), power generation (in 2 studies), and electricity market (in 2
studies).
Studies on power distribution use 33-bus [110] and 69-bus [94]
radial distribution test systems in one primary study [S056], and
IEEE 24-bus reliability test system (MatPower case24 ieee rts) in
24
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Fig. 35: Distribution of power grid test cases
another one [S018]. We recall that IEEE 24-bus RTS is based on
IEEE RTS-79 [111], [112] and is used in 8 primary studies, all 8
focused on power transmission, 2 of which are dealing also with
power generation.
39-bus New England test system (MatPower case39), obtained
from Bills et al. [113], is used in 9 studies, 3 of which are about
power generation and 8 are about power transmission.
The remaining test systems are all about power transmission. IEEE
4-bus test system (MatPower case4gs) is used in 2 studies; IEEE 9-
bus (case9) is found in 9 studies; IEEE 57-bus (case57) is adopted
by 11 and IEEE 300-bus (case300) by 13 studies, while MatPower
cases representing the Polish 400, 220 and 110 kV networks during
either peak or off-peak conditions are used in 7 studies.
Power generation is also studied on two-area Kundur system test
case [81], which parameters can be found in the Matlab Power System
Toolbox [114], in two studies ([S005, S059]); and on multi-area
load frequency control schemes installed with proportional-integral
controllers, as described by Jiang et al. [115], in one study [S118].
The other used test cases are summarized in Figure 36. Irrigation
system consisting of a cascade of a number of canal pools, as
presented in Amin et al. [116], is used in two primary studies [S072,
S078]. Also an unstable batch reactor system presented by Walsh et
al. [117], which is a fourth order unstable linear system with two
inputs, is employed in two works [S087, S094]. Tennessee Eastman
process control system model and associated multi-loop proportional-
integral control law, as proposed by Ricker [118], is adopted in three
studies [S070, S075, S094]. PHANToM Premium 1.5A [119], that
is a haptic device from SensAble Technologies, is used once in a
simulation setup [S105]. Finally, a rotorcraft in a cruise flight [120]
is simulated in two studies [S090, S093].
There are also 8 primary studies, which use ad hoc simulation test
systems to validate their results. Specifically, Kwon et al. [S082] use
Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 runs on an unmanned aerial system
navigation system integrating the inertial navigation system and the
global positioning system implemented in Matlab. D’Innocenzo et
al. [S088] perform Matlab/Simulink simulations on the multi-hop
wireless network deployed in a room to connect the temperature
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Fig. 36: Distribution of other used test cases
sensor to the variable-air-volume box, which is positioned nearby the
room. Also Eyisi and Koutsoukos [S098] perform Matlab/Simulink
simulations on a single-input single-output (SISO) system; it deals
with a velocity control of a single joint robotic arm over a commu-
nication network. Bezzo et al. [S106] use robot operating system9
(ROS) based simulator emulating electromechanical and dynamical
behavior of the real robot. In Park et al. [S108] simulations are
carried out using a simple model of air traffic operations. Shoukry and
Tabuada [S111] use an UGV model implemented in Matlab. Jones
et al. [S113] simulate a train, which uses an electronically-controlled
pneumatic braking system modeled as a classical hybrid automaton.
Finally, Shoukry et al. developed a “theory solver in Matlab and
interfaced it with the pseudo-Boolean SAT solver SAT4J” [S117],
where the simulations are performed on linear dynamical systems
with a variable number of sensors and system states.
It is not surprising that most advanced and realistic validation
methods have been exploited in the power networks application
domain. Despite research on CPS Security in this domain appears
quite mature, a benchmark is still missing.
D. Repeatability and availability of replication package
The possibility of reproducing the evaluation or validation results
provided by the authors is called repeatability, while the possibility of
exploring changes to experiment parameters is known as workability.
The repeatability process is a good scientific practice [121]. The so
called Artifact Evaluation Process10 is used in a number of confer-
ences in computer science, and a similar concept of repeatability
evaluation of computational elements has been introduced in cyber-
physical systems domain in 2014 ACM Hybrid Systems Computation
and Control (HSCC) conference11. However, such practice is rather
new to several research communities working on CPS: we found no
primary study with a replication package. Thus, we have isolated the
information concerning the availability of a replication package and
extended the simple dimension provided in Yuan et al. [70] in a way
that repeatability is considered high when the authors provide enough
details about
• the steps performed for evaluating or validating the study,
• the developed or used software,
• the used or simulated testbed, if any, and
• any other additional resource,
in a way that interested third parties can be able to repeat the evalua-
tion or validation of the study. Otherwise, we have low repeatability.
9http://www.ros.org
10http://www.artifact-eval.org
11http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/conferences/hscc2016/re.html
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Such high-level definition of repeatability values has ensured that
the primary studies using standard test systems from Section VI-C
and well known experimental testbeds have received high values of
repeatability, where steps performed in their experiments, case studies
and/or simulation examples have been described with enough details.
On the other hand, the usage of some ad hoc simulation test system
has caused some low values of repeatability assigned. As shown in
Figure 37, 82 studies (69.49%) have a high repeatability value, and
5 studies (4.24%) have a low repeatability score. As a note, we did
not have the possibility to evaluate the repeatability of 31 studies
(26.27%) since they do not present any experiment, case study or
simulation example.
Not applicable
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Fig. 37: Distribution of primary studies by repeatability
Overall, we advocate the improving of repeatability and worka-
bility of computational results of the papers by adopting the best
practices of repeatability process and creating related replication
packages, because we strongly believe in the usefulness of repeata-
bility to empower others to build on top of the contributions of a
paper12 and thus accelerate scientific and technological progress.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
We discussed potential future research trends and challenges for
CPS security throughout this paper in the context of the various
discussions of obtained results (Sections IV, V, and VI); in the
following we discuss more general observations about implications
for future research on CPS security.
CPS security is a relatively young research domain that is expe-
riencing a strong academic and industrial interest in the very few
years, and both European Commission and NSF are very oriented
in financing research in this area. From the data obtained in this
systematic mapping study it can be inferred that the potential of the
developed results and methodologies in addressing realistic emerging
problems in several application domains (first of all, power systems)
is very promising. As a consequence it is predictable that CPS secu-
rity will be a “hot topic” for the forthcoming years. Our investigation,
based on the current state of the art, sheds some light on challenges
that will possibly represent the next steps of research in CPS security.
From a modeling point of view this study shows that, as usual in
the control theory community, most of the research is based on the
model-based paradigm. However, as experience demonstrates, e.g. in
the context of energy efficient control of building automation systems,
in many CPS application domains the cost of modeling is much larger
than the improvement margin in terms of efficiency/cost/performance.
As a consequence, we expect that part of future research will be based
on the data-based paradigm. This approach, based on “learning” tech-
niques and thus strictly connected with the computer science research
community, together with the recent large availability of (big!) data
deriving from CPS infrastructures, can also be of help towards a
more realistic and systematic modeling/mapping of attack/defense
models/strategies/architectures.
From a validation point of view, selected papers, as illustrated
in the previous sections, address a wide range of application do-
mains, system architectures, problem formulations and theoretical
12http://evaluate.inf.usi.ch/artifacts/aea
foundations: this makes it very difficult to compare different solutions
to similar problems, and we believe that time is mature for the
development of academic or industrial benchmarks, test-beds and
demonstrators. This could also help in disseminating how research
on CPS security can make the difference in each application domain.
From the point of view of the societal and industrial impact,
it is easy to infer from the selected papers that, even thought
realistic applications are almost always the main motivation for
research, a strong synergy between real industrial/societal problems
and theoretical investigation and results is still not apparent from the
scientific literature. It is also true that our research questions did not
include analysis of relevant projects related to CPS security, however
most of the selected papers do not directly relate to or derive from
direct collaboration between industry and academia: we hope and
expect that this will happen in the near future. Also, we were unable
to find research devoted to formal certification with reference to
international standards, whose satisfaction is often the biggest barrier
for testing and applying novel methods and technologies. Finally, we
observe the lack of workshops or symposia with the explicit target of
catalysing collaboration between industry and academia on specific
applications.
VIII. THREATS TO VALIDITY
We assessed the level of quality of our study by applying the
quality checklist proposed by Petersen et al. in 2015. The goal of
Petersen’s quality checklist is to assess an objective quality rating
for systematic mapping studies. According to the metrics defined in
Petersen’s quality checklist, we achieve an outstanding score of 54%,
defined as the ratio of the number of actions taken in comparison
to the total number of actions reported in the quality checklist. The
quality score of our study is far beyond the scores obtained by existing
systematic mapping studies in the literature, which have a distribution
with a median of 33% and 48% as absolute maximum value.
Overall, the high quality of our study has being ensured by
producing a detailed research protocol document in which all of
its steps have been subject to three external reviews by indepen-
dent researchers (see Section III) and by conducting our study by
following the well-accepted and updated guidelines of systematic
review/mapping study [9], [10]. In the following we detail the main
threats to validity of our study and how we alleviated them.
Conclusion validity. Conclusion validity refers to the relationship
between the extracted data, the produced map, and the resulting
findings [57].
In order to mitigate possible conclusion validities, first of all we
defined the search terms systematically and we document procedures
in our research protocol, so that our research can be replicated by
other researchers interested in the topic. Moreover, we documented
and used a rigorously defined data extraction form, so that we could
reduce possible biases that may happen during the data extraction
process; also, in so doing we had the guarantee that the data extraction
process has been consistent to our research questions.
On the same line, the classification scheme could have been another
source of threats to the conclusion validity of our study; indeed,
other researchers may identify classification schemes with different
facets and attributes. In this context, we mitigated this bias by (i)
performing an external evaluation by independent researchers who
were not involved in our research, and (ii) having the data extraction
process conducted by the principle researcher and validated by the
secondary researcher.
Internal validity. Internal validity is concerned with the degree
of control of our study design with respect to potential extraneous
variables influencing the study itself.
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In this case, having a rigorously defined protocol with a rigorous
data extraction form has surely helped in mitigating biases related
to the internal validity of our research. Also, for what concerns
the data analysis validity, the threats have been minimal since
we employed well-assessed descriptive statistics when dealing with
quantitative data. When considering qualitative data, the sensitivity
analysis performed on all extracted data has helped in having good
internal validity.
Construct validity. It concerns the validity of extracted data with
respect to our research questions. Construct validity concerns the
selection of the primary studies with respect to how they really
represent the population in light of what is investigated.
Firstly, as described in Section III-B, the automatic search has
been performed on multiple electronic databases to get relevant
studies independently of publishers’ policies and business concerns.
Moreover, we are reasonably confident about the construction of the
search string used in our automatic search since the used terms have
been identified by rigorously applying a systematic procedure (i.e.,
the quasi-gold standard systematic procedure as defined in [62]).
Moreover, the automatic search is complemented by the snowballing
activity performed during the search and selection activity of our
review process (see Figure 3), thus making us reasonably confident
about our search strategy. Since our automated search strategy ac-
tually relies on search engines quality and on how researchers write
their abstracts, the set of primary selected studies have been extended
by means of the backward and forward snowballing procedure.
After having collected all relevant studies from the automatic
search, we rigorously screened them according to well-documented
inclusion and exclusion criteria (see Section III-C); this selection
stage has been performed by the principle researcher, under the
supervision of the secondary researcher. Also, in order to assess
the quality of the selection process, both principle and secondary
researchers assessed a random sample of studies, and inter-researcher
agreement has been statistically measured with very good results (i.e.,
we obtained a Cohen-Kappa coefficient of inter-rater agreement of
more than 0.80).
External validity. It concerns the generizability of the produced map
and of the discovered findings [57].
In our research, the most severe threat related to external validity
consists in having a set of primary studies that is not representative of
the whole research on security for cyber-physical systems. In order to
mitigate this possible threat, we employed a search strategy consisting
of both automatic search and backward-forward snowballing of
selected studies. Using these two search strategies in combination
empowered us in mitigating this threat to validity. Also, having a
set of well-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria contributed to
reinforcing the external validity of our study.
A potential source of issues regarding the external validity of our
study can be the fact that only studies published in the English
language have been selected in our search. This decision may result
in a possible threat to validity because potentially important primary
studies published in other languages may have not been selected
in our research. However, the English language is the most widely
used language for scientific papers, so this bias can be reasonably
considered as minimal.
Similarly, grey literature (e.g., white papers, not-peer-reviewed
scientific publications, etc.) is not included in our research; this
potential bias is intrinsic to our study design, since we want to focus
exclusively on the state of the art presented in high-quality scientific
papers, and thus undergoing a rigorous peer-reviewed publication
process is a well-established requirement for this kind of scientific
works.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The main goal of this research is to analyse the publication trends,
characteristics, and validation strategies of existing methods and tech-
niques for CPS security from a researcher’s point of view. In order
to achieve this goal we designed and conducted an empirical study
that provides a detailed overview of publication trends, venues, and
research groups active on CPS security, and a thorough classification
providing an empirically validated foundation for evaluating existing
solutions for cyber-physical systems security. The main contribution
of this research is to provide a systematic map of research on
CPS security; the map has been carried out methodologically in
order to warrant the quality of the analysis and results. Additionally,
another main contribution of our research is the definition of a sound
and complete comparison framework for both existing and future
research on CPS security. These contributions will benefit researchers
proposing new approaches for CPS security, or willing to better
understand or refine existing ones.
We selected a total of 118 primary studies as a result of the
systematic mapping process, each of them belonging to different
research areas, such as automatic control, networked systems, smart
grid, security for information systems. The main findings emerging
from our study are summarized in Section I and explained in details
in Sections IV, V, and VI. The resulting implications for the future
research are presented in Section VII.
As future work we are planning to extend this study in order to
enlarge its scope to (1) papers weakly related to CPS security but not
included (such as typical distributed problems of reaching consensus
in the presence of malicious agents, as discussed in Section V-P) and
(2) papers/technical reports that derive from relevant academic and
industrial projects focused on CPS security.
Also, based on the learning of this work, our future scientific
research will be oriented to address CPS security problems providing
non-trivial mathematical models of the interaction between physical
systems and non-idealities due to communication protocols, in par-
ticular regarding wireless sensor and actuator networks.
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APPENDIX A
RESEARCH TEAM
Four researchers worked on this study, each of them with a specific
role within the research team:
- Principal researcher: PhD student with knowledge about cyber-
physical systems, and security for software and control systems;
he performed the majority of activities from planning the study
to reporting;
- Secondary researcher: assistant professor with background on
cyber-physical systems, control theory, networked control sys-
tems; he has been mainly involved in the conducting of the
study, specially in supporting the primary researcher during the
activities of comparison framework definition and data synthesis;
- Research methodologist: post-doctoral researcher with exper-
tise in empirical methods applied to software systems and
systematic literature reviews; he has been mainly involved in
(i) the planning phase of the study, and (ii) supporting the
principle researcher during the whole study, e.g., by reviewing
the data extraction form, selected primary studies, extracted data,
produced reports, etc.;
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- Advisor: senior researcher with many-years expertise in analysis
and control of nonlinear and hybrid systems, embedded control
systems, networked control systems. She made final decisions
on conflicts and options to “avoid endless discussions” [122],
and supported other researchers during the data synthesis and
findings synthesis activities.
From a geographical point of view, the research team has been
locally distributed in Italy, thus having a very low communication
overhead and lower chances of misunderstandings.
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